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FINANCING ELECTIONS AND “APPEARANCE OF CORRUPTION”:
CITIZEN ATTITUDES AND BEHAVIOR IN 2012
Molly J. Walker Wilson*

ABSTRACT
As political spending reaches new highs in the 2012 election
cycle, and as the controversy surrounding wealthy donors and
interest groups grows, polls demonstrate a surge of cynicism
among Americans who profess a belief that the American
political system is corrupt. The Supreme Court’s 2010
decision in Citizens United made possible the most recent
expansion of political spending. In this case, the question was
whether allowing corporations and unions to spend unlimited
amounts of money on political advertising would result in
corruption or the appearance of corruption. The majority on
the Court determined that it would not. Many observers have
disputed the majority’s conclusion with respect to corruption;
the effect on the appearance of corruption has received far less
attention. This Article focuses on this latter question, arguing
that there is a growing appearance-of-corruption problem in
American politics. The 2012 election cycle saw a modest
growth in small donor giving and volunteerism, but voter turnout was down from the previous two presidential elections.
Meanwhile, polls reveal that more than ever, Americans’
believe that money is corrupting the political process. This
Article explains the connection between the Court’s recent
campaign finance decisions and the current disillusionment of
the American public. The Article also explains why data from
the 2012 election likely underestimates the problem, and why
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the repercussions of our appearance-of-corruption problem are
likely to grow if the law continues to permit unchecked
political campaign spending.

INTRODUCTION

Most Americans believe that their government is corrupt. Citizens United
has come to represent a problem . . . that problem can be stated quite
simply: the people have lost faith in their government. They have lost the
faith that their government is responsive to them, because they have become
convinced that their government is more responsive to those who fund your
campaigns. . .
—Lawrence Lessig, testifying before Congress1
Outside these walls, the public’s perception is that not only is Congress a
do-nothing institution, but that it is bought and paid for as well. And, in
politics, perception is reality, and the perception is that it is getting worse,
not better.
—Charles Roemer, testifying before Congress2
As far back as the early 1970’s3, the Supreme Court has worried about
preventing the appearance of corruption arising from political campaign
spending. In Buckley v. Valeo, the Court articulated this concern when it
said, “impact of the appearance of corruption stemming from public
awareness of the opportunities for abuse inherent in a regime of large
individual financial contributions.”4 The twin concerns of preventing actual
corruption and preventing the appearance of corruption are the only interests
1

Taking Back Our Democracy: Responding to Citizens United and the Rise of Super
PACs: Hearing Before the S. Subcomm. on the Constitution, Civil Rights and Human
Rights of the S. Comm on the Judiciary, 112th Cong. (pg.-pg.) (2012) (statement of
Lawrence Lessig, Professor, Harvard Law School).
2
Taking Back Our Democracy: Responding to Citizens United and the Rise of Super
PACs: Hearing Before the S. Subcomm. on the Constitution, Civil Rights and Human
Rights of the S. Comm on the Judiciary, 112th Cong. (pg.-pg.) (2012) (statement of Charles
Roemer, former Governor of Louisiana).
3
See notes 12-13 infra, and accompanying text.
4
Buckley v. Valeo 424 U.S. 1, 27 (1976).
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the Court has held to be sufficiently important to allow for restrictions on
spending for campaign communication, which the Court has called
“speech.” Although “appearance of corruption” is omnipresent in the
Court’s campaign finance jurisprudence, this concern has received scant
attention as compared to actual corruption, which has occupied center stage.
Meanwhile, the Court’s narrow definition of corruption has yielded
Supreme Court and lower court opinions that allow for unprecedented
amounts of money to flood into political messaging.
As campaign spending has escalated, so has the controversy around new
structures for bundling and spending campaign funds, so-called Super
PACs. Members of the media, election law scholars, and watchdog groups
have disseminated information regarding the political objectives of wealthy
donors. Simultaneously, in the past two election cycles, the number of
campaign advertisements—most of them negative—have increased
dramatically.5 The public appears to be taking notice. Polls from 2010
through 2012 reveal that Americans are almost unanimous in feeling that
there is too much money in political campaigns.6 The polls reveal that the
Americans oppose Super PACs, would support a constitutional amendment
banning corporate political spending, and feel that the current system allows
wealthy interests to drown on the voice of ordinary citizens. Perhaps most
importantly, survey respondents believe that the current system of campaign
financing is corrupt, and many say that as a result, they are less likely to
vote in elections. 7
The current campaign finance landscape was profoundly influenced by
the 2010 Supreme Court case Citizens United v. FEC. 8 Citizens United
removed the existing barrier to unlimited independent spending. 9 Before
Citizens United, individuals (but not corporations) could spend unlimited
sums on independent (not coordinated with candidate) political advocacy.10
5

See fns 118-120 infra and accompanying text.
Part II C 2 infra, and accompanying text.
7
National Survey: Super PACs, Corruption, and Democracy, BRENNAN CENTER FOR
JUSTICE (April 24, 2012), http://www.brennancenter.org/analysis/national-survey-superpacs-corruption-and-democracy
8
Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876 (2010).
9
Id.
10
Under § 100.16 (a), an “Independent Expenditure” is defined as “an expenditure by a
person for a communication expressly advocating the election or defeat of a clearly
identified candidate that is not made in cooperation, consultation, or concert with, or at the
request or suggestion of, a candidate, a candidate's authorized committee, or their agents, or
6
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However, those contributions could not be pooled with the money of other
individuals. Individual contributions could be combined under the auspices
of a political action committee (PAC), but in this instance, there was a
contribution cap of $5,000. As a result of the Court’s decision in Citizens
United, the law changed. When the D.C. Circuit Court was required to
interpret the law in Speechnow.org,11 the court concluded that Citizens
United had removed the limits on individual donations to independent
groups. This decision led to the birth of the Super PACs.12 Whereas in the
past, traditional PACs could only receive donations up to $5,000 per year,
after Speechnow.org, donations to Super PACs were unlimited. According
to the Center for Responsible Politics, in 2012, super PACs spent a record
$65 million on independent expenditures and were major players in more
than a dozen congressional races.13
Empirical data suggests that the proliferation of money available to
influence politics undercuts citizens’ sense of political efficacy.14 Political
efficacy relates to the responsiveness of government to its citizens’
involvement in politics. 15 Social scientists have noted that when the
citizenry lacks a minimum level of political efficacy, members of the public
either in opposition or out of a sense of futility, stop participating in
a political party committee or its agents.” A communication is “made in cooperation,
consultation, or concert with, or at the request or suggestion of, a candidate, a candidate's
authorized committee, or their agents, or a political party committee or its agents” if it is a
coordinated communication under 11 C.F.R §109.21 or a party coordinated communication
under 11 CFR 109.37. See 2 U.S.C. § 431(17) (2002).
11
SPEECHNOW.ORG v. Federal Election Comm'n., 599 F.3d 686 (D.C. Cir. 2010). See
discussion in Part I. B. supra.
12
The Federal Election Commission recognizes Super PACs and hybrid PACs as political
action committees engaged in uncoordinated spending. A Super PAC (Independent
Expenditure-Only Political Committee) or Hybrid PAC (committee that maintains a noncontribution account) must register by filing FEC Form 1 [PDF] (Instructions [PDF]),
Statement of Organization within 10 days after raising or spending in excess of $1,000 in
connection with federal elections. Under "Type of Committee," the PAC would check box
5(f). Additionally, the committee must submit a letter to identify itself as a Super PAC or
Hybrid PAC.” (See Quick Answers to PAC Questions, Federal Election Commission (last
visited Feb. 14, 2013), http://www.fec.gov/ans/answers_pac.shtml#super_hybrid).
13
2010 Outside Spending, by Super PACs, OpenSecrets.org, Center for Responsive Politics
(last
updated
Nov.
12,
2012),
http://www.opensecrets.org/outsidespending/summ.php?cycle=2010&disp=O&type=S.
14
See Part IV B infra, and accompanying text.
15
Richard G. Niemi, Stephen C. Craig & Franco Mattei, Measuring Internal Political
Efficacy in the 1988 National Election Study, 85 AM. POL. SCI. REV 1407 (1991).; Timoth
Vercellotti, Prepared for presentation at the 2011 annual meeting of the American Political
Science association, Sept. 1-4, Seattle, WA.
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politics.16 Recent polling data suggests that Americans may be responding
to a lack of political efficacy by increasingly disengaging with the political
process.17
An examination of the 2012 election reveals an interesting pattern:
small donations and volunteering was strong, but voting was down—not
only from 2008 numbers, but from 2004 levels as well. At first blush, this
mixed picture seems curious. It is difficult to explain why high-investment
participation would be up, while low investment participation would be
down. However, certain features of the presidential campaign—and
specifically Obama’s campaign tactics—may explain the anomaly. The
ability of the Obama campaign to bolster political efficacy via various
channels of communication—including most notably the Internet—proved
to pay dividends in 2008. 18 In particular, the campaign’s slogans involved
a focus on the agency of the individual voter, and the power of the recipient
of the message to make a difference in the election.19 The Obama campaign
was rewarded for its efforts with record numbers of volunteers and small
donations.20 Obama was able to benefit from similar direct pleas for support
in 2012. In a substantially closer race, Obama needed to up the ante in his
16

Albert Bandura, Personal and Collective Efficacy in Human Adaptation and Change, in
ADVANCES IN PSYCHOLOGICAL SCIENCE VOLUME 1 51, 52 (John G. Adair, David Belanger,
& Kenneth L. Dion eds. 1998).
16
David Easton & Jack Dennis, The Child's Acquisition of Regime Norms: Political
Efficacy, 61 Am. Pol. Sci. Rev. 25 (1967),
17
See National Survey: Super PACs, Corruption, and Democracy, Brennan Center for
Justice
(April
24,
2012),
http://www.brennancenter.org/content/resource/national_survey_super_pacs_corruption_an
d_democracy; see also, Todd Paulson and David Schultz, Bucking Buckley: Voter
Attitudes, Tobacco Money, and Campaign Contribution Corruption in Minnesota Politics,
19 HAMLINE J. PUB. L. & POL'Y. 449, 469 (1997-1998).
18
Beth Fouhy, 2012 Campaign: Obama, Romney Volunteers Hope to Make the Difference
in
November,
HUFFINGTON
POST
(Feb.
13,
2013),
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/07/03/2012-campaign-obamaromney_n_1647029.html
19
Id.
20
For example, the Pew Research Center reported that “[In 2008,] young people provided
not only their votes but also many enthusiastic campaign volunteers. Some may have
helped persuade parents and older relatives to consider Obama’s candidacy. And far more
young people than older voters reported attending a campaign event while nearly one-inten donated money to a presidential candidate.” The donations alone were an
accomplishment for the Obama campaign, given that 66% of voters under age 30 voted for
Obama. See Scott Keeter, Juliana Horowitz & Alec Tyson, Young Voters in the 2008
Election,
PEW
RESEARCH
CENTER
(Nov.
13,
2008),
http://www.pewresearch.org/2008/11/13/young-voters-in-the-2008-election/
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turn-out-the-vote strategy.21 On election day, in November 2012, the
Democrats' turnout efforts were hailed by some as “historic.”22 In the
Republican camp, Mitt Romney stepped up efforts in an attempt to compete.
Yet, in spite of the proven success of direct appeals, after voter numbers
were calculated, it became clear that voter participation was down. Polling
of self-identified non-voters revealed that 54% professed belief that the
political process was corrupt.23 Although it is important to be cautious in
drawing conclusions based upon these data, the numbers imply a connection
between perceptions of corruption and depressing voter turnout. Moreover,
in light of the success of the Obama campaign in drawing out volunteers,
donors, and voters, the lower numbers from 2012 may portend a more
substantial decline in future elections. As Americans’ discontent with “big
money”24 in politics grows, increasingly, members of the public may decide
not to participate in politics.25 The appearance of corruption from the birth
of Super PACs and other campaign finance bundling groups could usher in a
new era of political apathy and citizen disengagement.
21

Robert Butler, US Election History: Razor- Thin Finish In 2012 Would be Far From
Nation's First, THEPRESIDENCY.US (Nov. 7, 2012), http://thepresidency.us/2012/11/uselection-history-razor-thin-finish-in-2012-would-be-far-from-nations-first/; see also, Lucy
Madison, In Last Days of Campaign, A Final Push to Get Out The Vote, CBS NEWS (Nov.
5, 2012, 6:00 AM), (CBS News called the election “nail-bitingly close”).
22
The predicted numbers and make-up of polling place no-shows was weighted against
Obama, making the get-out-the-vote ground game particularly important for his campaign.
The Suffolk University Political Research Center reported in advance of the election that
“[t]wo-thirds of the unlikely voters say they voted four years ago, backing Obama by more
than 2-1 over Republican John McCain. See Susan Page, Why 90 Million Americans Won't
Vote
in
November,
USA
TODAY
(Aug.
15,
2012,
6:15
AM),
http://usatoday30.usatoday.com/news/politics/story/2012-08-15/non-voters-obamaromney/57055184/.
23
Susan Page, Why 90 Million Americans Won't Vote in November, USA TODAY (Aug. 15,
2012, 6:15 AM), http://usatoday30.usatoday.com/news/politics/story/2012-08-15/nonvoters-obama-romney/57055184/.
24

The term “big money” is often used by opponents of the current campaign finance laws
and climate. See e.g., Money in Politics, COMMON CAUSE (last visited Feb. 17, 2013),
http://www.commoncause.org/site/pp.asp?c=dkLNK1MQIwG&b=4764307 (“Big money
has long dominated our elections, and the problem has worsened since the Supreme Court's
Citizens United ruling in 2010, which allowed corporations to spend unlimited amounts of
money on our elections. In campaign 2012, ‘independent’ groups spent about $1 billion,
much of it from anonymous individuals and corporations.”)
25
See generally Pollock, Philip H. III. 1983. The Participatory Consequences of Internal
and External Political Efficacy: A Research Note, 36 W. POL. Q., 400- 409. See also Philip
B. Heymann, Democracy and Corruption, 20 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 329, 328-329 (19961997)
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Part I of this Article provides background on campaign finance law,
highlighting the Court’s recent case of Citizens United, affirmed in
American Tradition Partnership, which provided fertile ground for new
funding structures that made possible the accumulation of large pools of
money to be spend on candidate and issue advertisements. This Part
explains the Supreme Court’s acceptance of citizen perceptions of
corruption as a legitimate basis for regulating campaign communication, but
notes that the Court has failed to elaborate or use this interest as a
determining factor in its decisions. Part II of the Article explains how the
Court’s decision in Citizens United triggered a series of events, including a
District Court case SpeechNow.org v. Federal Election Commission and the
subsequent birth of the Super PAC, which increased the potential for
bundling of contributions. This Part illustrates the effect of Super PACs and
other financing structures by citing data on the amount of independent
money spent during the most recent presidential election. Part III provides
a picture of how developments in campaign financing have influenced the
appearance of corruption, and includes extensive discussion of polling data
evincing Americans’ distrust of the political election process, and
government generally. Part IV discusses the implications of the polling data
revealing widespread perceptions of corruption in campaigns. This Part
starts with the Supreme Court’s own adoption of appearance of corruption
as a compelling concern, illustrating ways in which the Court has considered
the issue in opinions. This Part explains how perceptions of corruption
affect voters’ sense of political efficacy and how this, in turn, threatens
democracy. Finally, Part V looks at citizen involvement in the 2012
political election, both as a function of donations and volunteerism, and in
terms of turnout at the polls. An examination of the numbers reveals that
while small donations and volunteering remained strong, voting numbers
were down from 2008 and 2004. The discussion in this Part focuses on
Obama’s campaign strategy, arguing that the 2012 election cycle
simultaneously illustrates the importance of political efficacy, and portends
grave problems for future elections.
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I.

A HISTORY OF CAMPAIGN FINANCE JURISPRUDENCE AND
THE “APPEARANCE OF CORRUPTION”

Public suspicion regarding the role of money in politics dates back to
colonial times. Even the revered George Washington was accused of
exploiting money for political gain.26 Toward the close of the nineteenth
century, direct contributions from corporate treasuries helped to give
William McKinley’s Republican campaign a significant edge over
Democrat William Jennings Bryan, $16 million to $600.27 In the face of
widespread public opposition to McKinley’s campaign financing, Theodore
Roosevelt publicly opposed such practices. Roosevelt then suffered a major
crisis of public confidence when it was revealed that railroad and oil
companies provided seventy-five percent of his campaign funds during the

26

In 1757, Washington was charged with a kind of campaign spending irregularity in his
race for a seat in the Virginia House of Burgesses. Said to have purchased and distributed
more than a quart of rum, beer, and hard cider per voter (391 voters in the district) during
the campaign. Historian R. T. Barton set forth this account:
. . .the law passed by the House of Burgesses soon after the
election of 1758, which provides that no one should be qualified
to hold a seat in that house, who should, "before his election,
either himself or by any other person or persons on his behalf
and at his charge, directly or indirectly give, present or allow
any person or persons having voice or vote in such election any
money, meat, drink, entertainment or provision, or make any
present, gift, reward, or entertainment, &c., &c., in order to be
elected."
It is hardly to be supposed that this law was aimed at the worthy
delegate from Frederick, but it fit his case so exactly that had it
been in force prior to his election he would certainly have been
ineligible to his seat. For seven years Washington continued to
represent Frederick county, but there is no record of any
incident of interest connected with his subsequent elections. As
a law-abiding citizen it is to be presumed that thereafter meat
and drink, except in the ordinary way of hospitality, were not
among the means resorted to by Washington and his friends to
secure popular favor.
See New River Notes, http://www.newrivernotes.com/va/1electgw.htm (last visited Feb.
10, 2013). See also, John Morgan & Felix Várdy, On the Buyability of Voting Bodies, 23
J. THEORETICAL POL. 260, 261 (2011). (discussing Washington’s distribution of alcohol in
exchange for votes).
27
See National Public Radio, Whose Democracy Is It? A Public Radio Collaboration
Examining
Democracy
in
America
(November
2003),
http://www.npr.org/news/specials/democracy/index.html
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1904 presidential election.28 Outrage was so significant that Roosevelt
called for, and Congress passed the first major campaign-finance reform
law. The Tillman Act of 190729 banned "all contributions by corporations to
any political committee or for any political purpose." The sponsor of the
bill, Senator Benjamin Tillman, remarked that it was a "sad thought that the
Senate is discredited by the people of the United States as being a body
more or less corruptible or corrupted."30 Forty years after the passage of the
Tillman Act, the Taft-Hartley Act extended the ban on corporate donations
to labor unions. As early campaign finance legislation reveals, political
actors have long worried about campaign donations and outside spending
would appear to their constituents.
A.

Pre-Citizens United

The modern era of campaign finance law dates to the 1973 case,
United States Civil Service Commission v. National Ass’n of Letter Carriers.
In this case, the Supreme Court, in holding that federal employees should be
banned from taking formal positions in political parties or run for office on
partisan political tickets, said, “it is not only important that the Government
and its employees in fact, avoid practicing political justice, but it is also
critical that they appear to the public to be avoiding it, if confidence in the
system of representative Government is not to be eroded to a disastrous
extent.”31 This decision is notable in that the Court realized that an
important aspect of democratic politics public perception of the fairness of
the process.
28

Id.
Id. (Discussing the public recoil against the corruption of politics by business led
McKinley’s successor, Theodore Roosevelt, to act. In his 1905 message to Congress,
Roosevelt condemned the perception that the dollar speaks louder than the vote. "No
enemy of free government [is] more dangerous,” he stated, “and none so insidious."
Theodore Roosevelt, 1905 State of the Union Address.)
30
Jack Beatty, A Sisyphean History of Campaign Finance Reform, THE ATLANTIC, (July
2007),
http://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2007/07/a-sisyphean-history-ofcampaign-finance-reform/306066/
31
United States Civil Serv. Comm'n v. Nat'l Ass'n of Letter Carriers, 413 U.S. 548 (1973).
This case arose when a group of federal employees and local party committees challenged
§ 9(a) of the Hatch Act, 5 U.S.C. § 7324(a)(2), against federal employees' taking "an active
part in political management or in political campaigns." This was not the first Supreme
Court case to challenge the Hatch Act. In the earlier case, Oklahoma v. United States Civil
Serv. Comm'n, 330 U.S. 127 (1947), a divided Court likewise upheld the Act.
29
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One year after the decision in National Ass’n of Letter Carriers,
Congress amended the Federal Election Campaign Act (FECA). 32 The
FECA Amendments limited certain political contributions and expenditures,
imposed disclosure requirements on political committees who receive
contributions and individuals and groups who make contributions,
developed public financing programs for Presidential elections, and created
the Federal Election Commission as the administering agency of these
requirements.33 Predictably, the amendments were challenged, and in 1976,
the Court handed down its opinion in Buckley v. Valeo34. In Buckely,
appellants argued that limiting the use of money for political purposes
constituted an impermissible restriction speech, because in their view
“virtually all meaningful political communications in the modern setting
involve the expenditure of money.”35 The appellees argued that several
important governmental interests were advanced by the regulations,
including (1) preventing corruption or the appearance of corruption; (2)
“equaliz[ing] the relative ability of all citizens to affect the outcome of
elections,” and (3) tempering the dramatic increases in the costs of political
campaigns so as to encourage the participation of political candidates
lacking large sums of money.”36 Ultimately, the Buckley Court sustained
the Act’s individual contribution limits, disclosure provision, and public
financing scheme, but found the expenditure limitations “constitutionally
infirm.”37 In upholding limitations on direct contributions, the Court
determined that these limitations on direct contributions were justified by
Congress' interest in preventing not only actual corruption but also the
appearance of corruption, explaining that “Congress could legitimately
conclude that the avoidance of the appearance of improper influence ‘is also
critical . . . if confidence in the system of representative Government is not
to be eroded to a disastrous extent.”’38 The Buckley Court referred to the
32

See Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971, Pub. L. No. 92-225, 86 Stat. 3
(codified as amended in sections of 2, 18, and 47 U.S.C.).
33
See Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971, Pub. L. No. 92-225, 86 Stat. 3
(codified as amended in sections of 2, 18, and 47 U.S.C.).
34
See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 1 (1976).
35
See Buckley 424 U.S. at 11.
36
Id. at 25-26.
37
Id. at 143.
38
Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 26-28 (1976). Buckley, 424 U.S. at 27 (quoting
States Civil Serv. Comm'n v. Nat'l Ass'n of Letter Carriers, 413 U.S. 548, 565
(ellipsis in original)).

(1972)
(1972)

United
(1973)
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Government interest in "combating the appearance or perception of
corruption engendered by large campaign contributions" as of "almost
equal" importance to combating corruption.39
While the Buckley Court found a potential for direct contributions to
pose a threat to the legitimacy of elections, it did not view independent
expenditures as posing the same threat.40 The Court worried about limiting
political speech without having a sufficiently compelling reason to do so.41
In finding the expenditure limitations constitutionally infirm, the Court
noted that limiting spending “necessarily reduces the quantity of
expression… because virtually every means of communicating ideas in
today’s mass society requires the expenditure of money.”42 Moreover, the
Court asserted that “The First Amendment's protection against governmental
abridgment of free expression cannot properly be made to depend on a
person's financial ability to engage in public discussion.” 43 Finally, the
Court decided that there is nothing “insidious, improper, or unhealthy in
permitting such funds to be spent to carry the candidate’s message to the
electorate.”44 In so holding, the Court was making the determination that
unrestricted independent spending on political messaging does not create the

39

Id. at 27.
The Court concluded that “the weighty interests served by restricting the size of financial
contributions to political candidates are sufficient to justify the limited effect upon First
Amendment freedoms caused by the $1,000 contribution ceiling.” Buckley, 424 U.S. at
29. The Court also concluded that the $5,000 limitation on contributions by political
committees enhanced the opportunity of association “of bona fide groups to participate in
the election process, and the registration, contribution, and candidate conditions serve the
permissible purpose of preventing individuals from evading the applicable contribution
limitations by labeling themselves committees.” Id. at 35-36. And finally, the $25,000
limitation on total contributions during any calendar year was constitutional even though it
did impose a restriction on “the number of candidates and committees with which an
individual may associate himself by means of financial support,” since the restraint serves
“to prevent evasion of the $1,000 contribution limitation” and is thus no more than a
corollary to the individual limitation. Id. at 38. FECA as amended in 1974 limits
expenditures by individuals or groups “relative to a clearly identified candidate” to “$1,000
per candidate per election, and by a candidate from his personal or family funds to various
specified annual amounts depending upon the federal office sought, and restricts overall
general election and primary campaign expenditures by candidates to various specified
amounts, again depending upon the federal office sought.” Id. at 626.
41
The Court characterized limitations on expenditures as “restrict[ing] the quantity of
speech by individuals, groups, and candidates.” See Id. at 39.
42
Id.
43
See Buckley 424 U.S. at 48-49.
44
Id.
40
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appearance of corruption.45 The Buckley Court established that the only
constitutionally acceptable rationale for campaign finance regulation was to
combat the corruption or the appearance of corruption—no leveling of the
playing field or other rationale would suffice.46
In October of 1989, the Court heard arguments for Austin v. Michigan
Chamber of Commerce47 Plaintiffs in Austin were challenging a Michigan
law48 that prohibited non-media corporations from using general treasury
funds for independent expenditures in state election campaigns. The Court
held that “application of 54(1) to the Chamber is constitutional because the
provision is narrowly tailored to serve a compelling state interest.” 49 The
compelling state interest, according to the Court, was addressing “the
corrosive and distorting effects of immense aggregations of wealth that are
accumulated with the help of the corporate form and that have little or no
correlation to the public's support for the corporation's political ideas.”50
The Austin Court’s unease with “corporate domination” of political elections
relates to the goal of safeguarding First Amendment values by preserving
some space in the political “marketplace.”51 The numerous advantages
enjoyed by corporations “not only allow corporations to play a dominant
role in the Nation’s economy, but also permit them to use ‘resources
amassed in the economic marketplace’ to obtain ‘an unfair advantage in the
political marketplace.’”

45

130

As Dan Ortiz has explained, in the Court’s “Buckley view, [independent expenditures] do
not give rise to even the appearance of corruption. Thus, regulating such expenditures
would not serve to protect the integrity of the political process.” Daniel R. Ortiz,
Recovering the Individual in Politics, 15 N.Y.U. J. Legis. & Pub. Pol'y 263, 272 (2012)
46
The Court explicitly rejected the goal of “equalizing the relative ability of individuals and
groups to influence the outcome of elections.” See Buckley, 424 U.S. at 48-49. The Court
explained, “there is no precedent which supports the position that “the First Amendment
permits Congress to abridge the rights of some persons to engage in political expression in
order to enhance the relative voice of other segments of our society.” Id. at 49.
47
Austin v. Michigan Chamber of Commerce, 494 U. S. 652 (1990).
48
Michigan Campaign Finance Act, § 54(1), Mich. Pub. Acts 388 (1976).
49
Austin, 494 U. S. 652.
50
Id. at 659-60 (citations omitted). Articulating the twin campaign finance concerns as
“corruption of the appearance of corruption” was not new in Austin. The Court had earlier
held in FEC v. National Conservative Political Action Committee that "preventing
corruption or the appearance of corruption are the only legitimate and compelling
government interests thus far identified for restricting campaign finances". Federal Election
Comm'n v. Nat'l Conservative Political Action Comm., 470 U.S. 480, 496 -497 (1985).
51
Id. at 659.
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In Shrink Missouri the Court upheld Missouri’s $1075 funding limit.
Justice Souter’s opinion for the Court emphasized evidence that Missouri
residents perceived a need for limits. He wrote “[A]lthough majority votes
do not, as such, defeat First Amendment protections, the statewide vote on
Proposition A certainly attested to the perception relied upon here: [A]n
overwhelming 74 percent of the voters of Missouri determined that
contribution limits are necessary to combat corruption and the appearance
thereof.”52 The opinion cited newspaper stories and editorials arguing that
wealthy interests were controlling Missouri politics.53 Justice Souter’s
examples of media accounts was notable less in that they demonstrated
actual corruption, but rather in that they evinced a belief amongst Missouri
residents that money was having a corrupting influence.
In spite of the holdings in Austin and Shrink Missouri, lawmakers
heard a call for more comprehensive campaign finance reforms. In 2002,
Congress passed the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act (BCRA)54—or
McCain-Feingold Act. The BCRA was a Congressional attempt to close
“loopholes” in FECA and other portions of the United States Code “to purge
national politics of what is conceived to be the pernicious influence of ‘big
money’ campaign contributions.”55 The BCRA was challenged in the 2003
case, McConnell v. Federal Election Comm’n.56 The McConnell Court
52

Nixon v. Shrink Missouri Gov't PAC, 528 U.S. 377, 394 (2000) (internal quotations
omitted).
53
Id. at 393 (Justice Souter also pointed out that Missouri had previously adopted
campaign finance limits through a ballot proposition that had received 74% approval from
the voters.)
54
Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002, 2 U.S.C. §§ 1-504 (2002).
55
Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002, 2 U.S.C. §§ 1-504 (2002) (emphasis added.)
(Relevant statutes enacted by the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act include: 2 U.S.C.A. §
441(i), 441(k), 441(a), 438 (a), and 510.)). The Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act (BCRA)
formed the basis for McConnell v. Federal Election Comm'n. McConnell, 540 U.S. at 114.
FECA regulated “donations made by any person for the purpose of influencing any election
for Federal office,” but left unregulated donations made “solely for the purpose of
influencing state or local elections.” Id. at 122. As a result, prior to the enactment of
BCRA, corporations, unions, and even wealthy individuals “who had already made the
maximum permissible contributions to federal candidates” could contribute “nonfederal
money,” known as “soft money,” to political parties intended to influence state or local
elections. Id. at 123. Such soft money contributions were often “designed to gain access to
federal candidates” and were in many cases “solicited by the candidates themselves.” Id.
at 125. “The solicitation, transfer, and use of soft money thus enabled parties and
candidates to circumvent FECA’s limitations on the source and amount of contributions in
connection with federal elections.” Id. at 126.
56
McConnell v. Federal Election Comm'n., 540 U.S. 93, 203–209 (2003).
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found limits on electioneering communications permissible, citing, among
other things, concern for the “eroding of public confidence in the electoral
process through the appearance of corruption.”57 The McConnell Court
referred at one point to the "Government's strong interests in preventing
corruption, and in particular the appearance of corruption." The Courts
special emphasis on appearance suggests a growing concern about the
potential for citizens to disengage with the political process as well as a
focus on the legitimacy of democratic institutions.58
B.

Citizens United

When the Citizen’s United59 opinion was handed down, it set off a
storm of controversy and commentary from law makers, political pundits,
scholars, and anyone else who had been watching and waiting for the
Supreme Court decision. The decision involved a question of whether a notfor-profit advocacy group, Citizens United, could advertise and offer freeof-charge its documentary, Hillary: The Movie in the thirty-day period
leading up to an election. 60 Both the advertisements for the movie and the
movie itself were highly critical of Hillary Clinton, and made the case that
she was unfit to serve as president of the United States.61 The group
57

Id. (citing Federal Election Comm’n v. National Right to Work Comm., 459 U.S. 197,
208 (2010)). “Electioneering communication” is defined “any broadcast, cable, or satellite
communication” that “refers to a clearly identified candidate for Federal office” and is
made within thirty days of a primary or sixty days of a general election. Citizens United,
130 S. Ct. at 887 (citing 2 U.S.C. § 434(f)(3)(A)).
§ 434(f)(3)(A)).
§ 434(f)(3)(A)).
7 See Adam
58
Id. at 47, emphasis added.
59
Citizens United v. Federal Election Comm'n, 130 S. Ct. 876 (2010).
60
At the conclusion of a lengthy analysis of various arguments made by Citizens United,
Kennedy concluded:
As the foregoing analysis confirms, the Court cannot resolve this case on a narrower
ground without chilling political speech, speech that is central to the meaning and purpose
of the First Amendment. It is not judicial restraint to accept an unsound, narrow argument
just so the Court can avoid another argument with broader implications. In-deed, a court
would be remiss in performing its duties were it to accept an unsound principle merely to
avoid the necessity of making a broader ruling. Here, the lack of a valid basis for an
alternative ruling requires full consideration of the continuing effect of the speech
suppression upheld in Austin. Citizens United, 130 S.Ct. at 892 (internal citation omitted).
61
“To implement the proposal, Citizens United was prepared to pay for the video-ondemand; and to promote the film, it produced two 10-second ads and one 30-second ad for
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Citizens United receives corporate funding, as such, the broadcasting of this
type of “electioneering communication” was forbidden under federal law.62
The District Court denied Citizens United’s request for declaratory and
injunctive relief, and granted the Federal Election Commission judgment as
a matter of law, based upon existing campaign finance laws.63
By a vote of 5-4, the Court, per Justice Kennedy, overturned Austin v.
Michigan Chamber of Commerce64 and the portion of McConnell v. Federal
Election Commission65 that restricted independent corporate expenditures,
as codified in section 203 of the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act
(BCRA).66 In particular, the Citizens United decision invalidated laws
forbidding corporations and unions from using general treasury funds for
“electioneering communication,” political advocacy transmitted by
broadcast, cable, or satellite communication in the period leading up to a
federal election.67 After the ruling, no state could limit the amount of
money corporations or unions poured into advertising for or against issues
or candidates in the run-up to an election.68

Hillary. Each ad includes a short (and, in our view, pejorative) statement about Senator
Clinton, followed by the name of the movie and the movie’s Website address.” Id. at 887.
62
2 U.S.C. §441b(b)(2) (2006) (for a definition of “electioneering communication” see fn
57, supra).
63
See Citizen United v. Federal Election Comm'n., 530 F. Supp. 2d 274 (D.D.C.2008)
(denying Citizens United’s request for a preliminary injunction). The court held that §441b
was facially constitutional under McConnell, and that §441b as constitutional as applied to
Hillary because it was “susceptible of no other interpretation than to inform the electorate
that Senator Clinton is unfit for office, that the United States would be a dangerous place in
a President Hillary Clinton world, and that viewers should vote against her.” Id. at 279.
64
Austin v. Michigan Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652 (1990), overruled by Citizens
United v. Federal Election Comm'n, 130 S. Ct. 876 (2010).
65
McConnell v. Federal Election Comm'n, 540 U.S. 93 (2003), overruled by Citizens
United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876 (2010). In McConnell v. Federal Election Comm’n., the
Court upheld limits on electioneering communications in a facial challenge, relying on the
holding in Austin v. Michigan Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652 (1990), banning
political speech when it originated from a corporate entity. McConnell v. Federal Election
Comm’n, 540 U. S. at 203–209.
66
2 U.S.C. § 434(f)(3)(A) (2006) (Section 203 of BCRA amended 2 U.S.C. § 441b(b)(2) to
prohibit any “electioneering communication,” which is defined as “any broadcast, cable, or
satellite communication” that “refers to a clearly identified candidate for Federal office”
and is made within thirty days of a primary or sixty days of a general election. Citizens
United, 130 S. Ct. at 887 (citing 2 U.S.C. § 434(f)(3)(A)).
67
2 U.S.C. §441b (2006).
68
Much has been made of the fact that the group Citizens United, in its arguments,
provided the Court with many avenues by which the Court could decide the question on
narrow grounds.
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In striking down the previous corporate spending limits, Kennedy
asserted that “independent expenditures, including those made by
corporations, do not give rise to corruption or the appearance of
corruption.”69 Justice Kennedy, writing for the Court in Citizens United,
decisively rejected Austin’s distortion rationale, finding this interest
49

“unconvincing and insufficient.”
Importantly, Kennedy asserted that
“[t]he appearance of influence or access . . .[would] not cause the electorate
to lose faith in our democracy.” 70 The only evidence for this supposition
was Kennedy’s own conclusion that “[t]he fact that a corporation, or any
other speaker, is willing to spend money to try to persuade voters
presupposes that the people have the ultimate influence over elected
officials.”71 Confident that his logic would guide voter behavior, Kennedy
concluded that unlimited corporate spending would not adversely affect
citizen participation in elections.72
In response to the majority’s opinion, Justice Stevens penned a
blistering dissent in which he questioned virtually all of Kennedy’s
assumptions. Stevens wrote, “In their haste to knock down yet another
straw man, our colleagues simply ignore the fundamental concerns of the
Austin Court and the legislatures that have passed laws like §203: to
safeguard the integrity, competitiveness, and democratic responsiveness of
the electoral process.
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Stevens went on to assert

A democracy cannot function effectively when its constituent
members believe laws are being bought and sold . . .73 At stake in
the legislative efforts to address this threat is therefore not only
69

Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. 876 (2010).
Id.
71
Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 910.
72
See e.g. Richard L. Hasen, Citizens United and the Illusion of Coherence, 109 Mich. L.
Rev. 581, 609 (2011)(“Note the majority's unsupported empirical statement--apparently for
all types of elections and any identity of speaker--that independent spending can never
cause voters to ‘lose faith in our democracy.’” In spite of Kennedy’s assertion, a number of
commentators argued that the opinion purports to make speech available for all, but
actually serves to hinder participation For example. Monica Youn proposes that the
opinion establishes a “’source-blind’ approach to the regulation of money in politics that
forbids the state from differentiating among different sources of political spending . . .
[u]nder [this] fully commodified conception of speech, speakers drop out of the picture. . .”
Youn’s account highlights the Court’s focus on the “free” generation of copious amounts
of speech, rather than the right of individuals to possess unfettered ability to express views.
Monica Young, First Amendment Fault Lines and the Citizens United Decision 5 Harvard
L. & Pol. Rev. 135, 138 (2011).
73
Id. at 964.
70
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the legitimacy and quality of Government but also the public’s
faith therein, not only “the capacity of this democracy to represent
its constituents[but also] the confidence of its citizens in their
capacity to govern themselves.”74

Steven’s dissent was notable in part because it explicitly contemplated the
potential for damage from the appearance of corruption. He found the
implications and potential effects of the opinion deeply troubling.
He was not alone. The Citizens United opinion received immediate
and wide-spread media coverage. There was plenty of discussion and
commentary scholars,75 and media coverage reached a large number of
American citizens. Bill Moyers interviewed Monica Youn and Zephyr
Teachout on PBS,76 an initial New York Times article77 received more than
2,000 posted comments and was followed by a series of follow-up articles
and a spate of editorials.78 Other widely read news outlets and blogs
published stories and opinion pieces on the decision, including the Wall
Street Journal, the Washington Post, Politico, Slate, USA Today, the
Huffington Post, to name just a few, 79 and television outlets of all political
74

Id. at 964. (citing Federal Election Comm'n v. Wisconsin Right to Life, Inc., 551 U. S.,
449, 507 (2007) (Souter, J., dissenting) and McConnell v. Federal Election Comm'n, 540
U. S., at 144 (quoting Nixon v. Shrink Missouri Gov't PAC, 528 U.S. 377, 390 (2000)).
75
Citizens United v. FEC (Amicus Brief), BRENNAN CENTER FOR JUSTICE (Jan. 21, 2010),
http://www.brennancenter.org/content/resource/citizens_united_v_fec/; Erin Miller, What
Should Congress Do About Citizens United?, SCOTUSBLOG.COM (Jan. 24, 2010, 10:30
PM),
http://www.scotusblog.com/?p=15469 (Laurence H. Tribe, Professor of
Constitutional Law at Harvard Law School, discusses the decision in Citizens United v.
Federal Election Commission)
76
Free
Speech
for
Corporations,
PBS.ORG
(Jan.
29,
2010),
http://www.pbs.org/moyers/journal/01292010/profile2.html
77
Adam Liptak, Justices, 5-4, Reject Corporate Spending Limit, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 21,
2010), http://www.nytimes.com/2010/01/22/us/politics/22scotus.html?pagewanted=all.
78
See e.g., Editorial, The Court's Blow to Democracy, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 1, 2010),
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/01/22/opinion/22fri1.html; Editorial, When Other Voices
are
Drowned
Out,
N.Y.
TIMES
(March
25,
2012),
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/03/26/opinion/when-other-voices-are-drowned-out.html;
Editorial,
Citizens
United,
N.Y.
TIMES
(June
25,
2012),
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/06/26/opinion/the-court-citizens-united.html; Matt Bai,
How Much Has Citizens United Changed the Political Game?, N.Y. TIMES (July 17, 2012),
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/07/22/magazine/how-much-has-citizens-united-changedthe-political-game.html?pagewanted=all.
79
See Philip Rucker, Citizens United used 'Hilary: The Movie' to Take on McCainFeingold, WASH. POST (Jan. 22, 2010), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wpdyn/content/article/2010/01/21/AR2010012103582.html; John C. Coates and Taylor
Lincoln, Fulfilling the Promise of 'Citizens United,' WASH. POST (Sept. 6, 2011),
http://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/fulfilling-the-promise-of-
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stripes weighed in.80 CNN analyst and New Yorker contributor, Jeffrey
Toobin wrote a detailed analysis of Chief Justice Robert’s strategy regarding
the opinion, which he also discussed it in his book, The Oath: The Obama
White House vs. The Supreme Court.81 Other authors, including Monica
Youn, Bill Moyers, and Lawrence Lessig, among others, authored books
focused on the opinion and its implications.82

citizensunited/2011/09/02/gIQAa4np7J_story.html; Dan Eggen, Citizens United
Challenges the Strident Side of Supreme Court Ruling, WASH. POST (April 1, 2010),
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wpdyn/content/article/2010/03/31/AR2010033104028.html; Ashby Jones, What Will Citizens
United Do to the 2010 Election Cycle?, Law Blog, WALL ST. J. (Jan. 21, 2010, 2:59 PM),
http://blogs.wsj.com/law/2010/01/21/what-will-citizens-united-do-to-the-2010-electioncycle/; Bradley Smith, The Incumbent's Bane: Citizens United and the 2010 Election,
WALL
ST.
J.
(Jan.
25,
2011),
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748703555804576101622398145818.html;
Daniel Henninger, The Rage Against Citizens United, WALL ST. J. (Oct. 28, 2010),
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052702304173704575578461221742460.html;
Richard L. Hasen, Money Grubbers, SLATE (Jan, 21, 2010, 12:58 PM),
http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/jurisprudence/2010/01/money_grubbers.h
tml; Richard L. Hasen, The Numbers Don't Lie, Slate, (March 9, 2012),
http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/politics/2012/03/the_supreme_court_s_cit
izens_united_decision_has_led_to_an_explosion_of_campaign_spending_.html;
Joan
Biskupic and Fredreka Schouten, Supreme Court Rolls Back Campaign Spending Limits,
USA
Today,
(Jan
21,
2010,
5:50
PM),
http://www.usatoday.com/news/washington/judicial/2010-01-21-campaign-spendingsupreme-court_N.htm; Deborah Tedford, Supreme Court Rips Up Campaign Finance
Laws,
NPR,
(Jan
21,
2010),
http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=122805666; Jason Linkins, The
Supreme Court's Citizen United Decision is Terrifying, Huffington Post (March 23, 2010,
6:12
AM),
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2010/01/21/the-supreme-courtscitize_n_432127.html.
80
See Ken Klukowski, Founding Fathers Smiling After Supreme Court Campaign Finance
Ruling, FOXNEWS (Jan 22, 2010), http://www.foxnews.com/opinion/2010/01/22/kenklukowski-supreme-court-amendment-mccain-feingold/ ; Ilya Shapiro on Citizens United
on MSNBC's Rachel Maddow Show, CATO INSTITUTE (July 23, 2012),
http://www.cato.org/multimedia/video-highlights/ilya-shapiro-citizens-united-msnbcsrachel-maddow-show
81
Jeffrey Toobin, Money Unlimited: How Chief Justice John Roberts Orchestrated the
Citizens
United
Decision,
THE
NEW
YORKER
(May
21,
2012),
http://www.newyorker.com/reporting/2012/05/21/120521fa_fact_toobin; JEFFREY TOOBIN,
THE OATH: THE OBAMA WHITE HOUSE AND THE SUPREME COURT (2012).
82
MONICA YOUN , MONEY, POLITICS, AND THE CONSTITUTION: BEYOND CITIZENS UNITED (
2011); JEFFREY D. CLEMENTS & BILL MOYERS, CORPORATIONS ARE NOT PEOPLE: WHY
THEY HAVE MORE RIGHTS THAN YOU DO AND WHAT YOU CAN DO ABOUT IT (2012);
THOM HARTMANN, UNEQUAL PROTECTION: HOW CORPORATIONS BECAME "PEOPLE" - AND
HOW YOU CAN FIGHT BACK ( 2010); LAWRENCE LESSIG, REPUBLIC, LOST: HOW MONEY
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In June 2012, the Court reaffirmed the Citizens United ruling in a
brief, per curiam, 5-4 decision that summarily reversed a decision of the
Montana Supreme Court, which had upheld the state’s existing restrictions
on corporate political spending.83 The Montana court had ruled that the
state’s distinctive history and characteristics warranted a departure from the
principles announced in Citizens United. In spite of numerous amicus briefs
containing testimonials about the dangers of unchecked corporate spending
on political advocacy,84 the majority held firmly onto its earlier position,
stating:
The question presented in this case is whether the holding of
Citizens United applies to the Montana state law. There can be no
serious doubt that it does…Montana’s arguments in support of the
judgment below either were already rejected in Citizens United, or
fail to meaningfully distinguish that case.85

Again, media coverage of the topic was extensive, both leading up to
and following the decision.86
CORRUPTS CONGRESS--AND A PLAN TO STOP IT (2011). (These books are almost
unwaveringly critical of the decision and pessimistic about the short and long-term effects.)
83
American Tradition Partnership v. Bullock, 132 S. Ct. 2490 (2012).
84
Lyle Denniston, Opinion Recap: Citizens United Solidified, SCOTUSBLOG.COM (June
25, 2012, 12:48 PM), http://www.scotusblog.com/2012/06/opinion-recap-citizens-unitedsolidified/ (“The brevity of the unsigned (“Per Curiam”) opinion for the majority
overruling the Montana Supreme Court suggested that the five Justices who jointed in
Citizens United were totally unmoved by a stack of friend-of-court briefs urging the Court
to reconsider that decision in the wake of the flood of money going into races this year,
especially for the presidency and for seats in Congress.").
85
American Tradition Parternship v. Bullock, 132 S.Ct. 2490, 2491 (2012). 567 U. S. ____
(2012) (slip opinion p. 1)
86
Campaign Finance (Super PACs), Times Topics, N.Y.TIMES (Nov. 12, 2012),
http://topics.nytimes.com/top/reference/timestopics/subjects/c/campaign_finance/index.htm
l ; Matt Bai, How Much Has Citizens United Changed the Political Game?, N.Y. TIMES
(July 17, 20120), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/07/22/magazine/how-much-has-citizensunited-changed-the-political-game.html?pagewanted=all; Adam Liptak, Court Declines to
Revisit Its Citizens United Decision, N.Y. TIMES (June 25, 2012),
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/06/26/us/supreme-court-declines-to-revisit-citizensunited.html; Peter Overby, Supreme Court Says Montana Cannot Ignore 'Citizens United'
Ruling,
NPR
(June
25,
2012),
http://www.npr.org/blogs/itsallpolitics/2012/06/25/155707295/supreme-court-saysmontana-cannot-ignore-citizens-united-ruling; Amanda Terkel, Montana Nonpartisan
Judicial Elections System Struck Down by Appeals Court, HUFFINGTON POST (Sept. 18,
2012, 9:33 PM),
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/09/18/montanas-ban-politicalendorsements-judicial_n_1895318.html?utm_hp_ref=politics; Seth Cline, Supreme Court
Considering Case that Defies Citizens United Ruling, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REPORT (June
15, 2012), http://www.usnews.com/news/articles/2012/06/15/supreme-court-considering-
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Following the decision, there was a flood of articles addressing a variety of
topics, from the changing role of the Roberts Court to the implications for
First Amendment jurisprudence, to the implications for corporate
governance, theory, and tax law. Very little of the commentary even
mentioned the perceptions of the American voter.87 This omission is
surprising, given the prominence of the “appearance of corruption” issue in
the Citizens United and earlier campaign finance decisions. How corrupt
the process appears is a concern that is prominently featured in every
Supreme Court campaign finance opinion, dating back to pre-Buckley days.
This “appearance” concern is routinely discussed in tandem with “actual”
corruption.88
SpeechNow.org v. Federal Election Commission89 a D.C. Circuit case,
was decided two months after Citizens United. The issue in this case was
whether the federal government may require an unincorporated association
that makes only independent expenditures to register and report as a political
committee.90 If such a committee were designated “political committee,” it
would then be subject to various requirements and restrictions.91 After

case-that-defies-citizens-united-ruling; Seth Cline, Supreme Court Re-Affirms Citizens
United,
U.S.
NEWS
&
WORLD
REPORT
(June
25,
2012),
http://www.usnews.com/news/articles/2012/06/25/supreme-court-re-affirms-citizensunited; Rachel Weiner, Supreme Court's Montana Decision Strengthens Citizens United,
The
Fix,
WASH.
POST
(June
25,
2012,
10:43
AM),
http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/the-fix/post/supreme-courts-montana-decisionstrengthens-citizens-united/2012/06/25/gJQA8Vln1V_blog.html; Michael Doyle, Citizens
United Stands; No Exceptions for States, THE SEATTLE TIMES (June 26, 2012, 8:31 AM
Updated
1:55
PM),
http://seattletimes.com/html/politics/2018532177_scotuscampaign26.html; Josh Levs and
Bill Mears, Supreme Court, CNN (June 25, 2012), http://articles.cnn.com/2012-0625/politics/politics_scotus-campaign-finance_1_corporate-political-spending-campaignspending-citizens-united-decision?_s=PM:POLITICS
87
Exceptions include Adam M. Samaha, Regulation for the Sake of Appearance, 125 Harv.
L. Rev. 1563 (2012) and Robert F. Bauer, The Varieties of Corruption and the Problem of
Appearance: A Response to Professor Samaha, 125 Harv. L. Rev. F. 91 (2012).
88
Which has come to be defined as “quid-pro-quo” corruption. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S.
1, 27 (1976).
89
SPEECHNOW.ORG v. Federal Election Comm'n., 599 F.3d 686 (D.C. Cir. 2010).
90
According to the Federal Election Commission Act (FECA) of 1972, a political
committee is “any committee, club, association, or other group of persons” that receives
contributions of more than $1000 in a year or makes expenditures of more than $1000 in a
year. 2 U.S.C. § 431(4) (2002).
91
Once a group is so designated, contributions to the committee are restricted by 2 U.S.C.
§ 441a(a)(1)(C) and 441a(a)(3). The first provision limits an individual’s contribution to a
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noting that the committee in question proposed to engage exclusively in
independent expenditures, the court in Speechnow.org said, “Because of the
Supreme Court’s recent decision in Citizens United v. FEC, the analysis is
straightforward. There, the Court held that the government has no anticorruption interest in limiting independent expenditures.”92 Previously, as
the SpeechNow.org court pointed out, the “Court concluded that limiting the
government’s anticorruption interest to preventing quid pro quo interest to
preventing quid pro quo was a ‘crabbed view of corruption, and particularly
of the appearance of corruption’ that ‘ignores precedent, common sense, and
the realities of political fundraising.’93 The circuit court acknowledged that
the Citizens United Court had “retracted this view of the government’s
interest.” After concluding that the Supreme Court had rescinded its prior
commitment to addressing broader corruption concerns, the Speechnow.org
court had no choice but to lift restrictions on independent expenditure
committees.94 This holding would have important implications for the
evolution of new forms of political action committees and similar non-profit
political advocacy groups.95
II.

AFTER CITIZENS UNITED: THE RISE OF THE SUPER PAC

Although the direct impact on corporate spending patterns remains
murky, without question the campaign finance landscape has undergone
dramatic changes since the handing down of Citizens United. In 2008—the
last presidential election—total spending was $301.6 million.96 In the 2012
presidential election cycle, estimated spending by independent groups rose

political committee to $5000 per calendar year; the second limits an individual’s total
contributions to all political committees to $69,900 biennially. Id.
92
SPEECHNOW.org, 599 F.3d at 692-693.
93
McConnell, 540 U.S. at 152.
94
SPEECHNOW.org, 599 F.3d 686.
95
See discussion, section II infra.
96
Evan Mackinder, Ten Weeks Out from Election Day, Outside Spending Exceeds 2008
Total, OpenSecrets.org, CENTER FOR RESPONSIVE POLITICS (Sept. 6, 2012, 11:15 AM),
http://www.opensecrets.org/news/2012/09/ten-weeks-out-from-election-day-out.html; see
also 2008 Presidential Campaign Financial Activity Summarized: Receipts Nearly Double
2004
Total,
FEDERAL
ELECTION
COMMISSION
(June
8,
2009),
http://www.fec.gov/press/press2009/20090608PresStat.shtml (reporting that “Individuals,
parties and other groups spent $168.8 million independently advocating the election or
defeat of presidential candidates during the 2008 campaign.”).
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to $644.6 million.97 Total independent spending for the 2012 election cycle
was more than $1.3 billion.98 Although Citizens United has led, in a stepwise fashion, to an increase in independent spending, a relatively small
amount is attributable to direct corporate spending.99 Direct corporate
expenditures have been tempered by the fear of negative publicity from
flagrant political spending.100 Instead of spawning a rash of direct
independent spending by corporations, the decision has led to a series of
subsequent Court decisions that have opened the door to new mechanisms
for bundling funds.101 One particularly prominent new structure is the socalled super political action committee (Super PAC).102 Super PACs have
been game-changers in the campaign finance realm.103 Before Citizens
United, individuals (but not corporations) could spend unlimited sums on
independent advertising directly supporting or opposing candidates.104
97

2012 Presidential Independent Expenditures, OpenSecrets.org, Center for Responsive
Politics (last visited Feb. 12, 2013), http://www.opensecrets.org/pres12/indexp.php.
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FOUNDATION
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http://reporting.sunlightfoundation.com/outside-spending/overview/.
99
Testimony before the U.S. Senate Judiciary Committee’s Subcommittee on the
Constitution, Civil Rights, and Human Rights (July 24, 2012) (statement of Ilya Shapiro,
Senior Fellow in Constitutional Studies at the Cato Institute).
100
Id. (“Exxon, Halliburton, and all these “evil” companies [or even so-called good ones,
like Apple and Google] aren’t suddenly dominating the political conversation. They
actually spend very little money on political advertising, partly because it’s more effective
to spend money on lobbying but more importantly, why would they want to alienate half of
their customers?”) In the spring of 2012, companies faced a record number of shareholder
resolutions demanding that companies disclose whether corporate funds were spent on
politics. As a result, a number of prominent companies cut ties with advocacy groups that
have been affiliated with various controversial positions. Corporations under pressure on
political spending, Fredreka Schouten and Martha T. Moore, USA Today April 13, 2012 (
http://www.usatoday.com/news/politics/story/2012-04-13/corporate-politicalspending/54251644/1)
101
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unknown. There is no legal obligation that Super PACs report sources of donations.
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Misunderstood?,
SALON.COM
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18,
2012,
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identified candidate that is not made in cooperation, consultation, or concert with, or at the
request or suggestion of, a candidate, a candidate's authorized committee, or their agents, or
a political party committee or its agents.” A communication is “made in cooperation,
consultation, or concert with, or at the request or suggestion of, a candidate, a candidate's
authorized committee, or their agents, or a political party committee or its agents” if it is a
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However, that money had to be spent by the individual directly, rather than
being pooled with the money of others in a political action committee
(PAC), which had a contribution cap of $5,000. Before Citizens United,
these PACs were also banned from accepting corporate or union funds.
After Citizens United, lower courts had no choice but to conclude that the
Court’s previous reasoning that limiting the justification for restricting
political speech (spending) to quid-pro-quo exchange for political favors had
changed.
The D.C. Circuit Court decision in Speechnow.org105 removed the
limits on individual donations to independent expenditure groups, which led
to the creation of the so-called Super PACs.106 Previously, the only type of
PAC existing was defined as any group receiving or spending $1,000 or
more to influence political elections. Whereas donations to these PACs
were capped at $5,000 per year, after Speechnow.org, there was no limit on
how much people could donate to a Super PAC. Moreover, before Citizens
United allowed for PACs to aggregate unlimited amounts of wealth from
various sources, an individual who wanted to spend money to influence a
federal election was required to own the ad by including a statement “paid
for by ________.” Prior to Speechnow.org, the alternative was contributing
to a so-called 527 (named for a provision in the tax code), organizations that
are not technically PACs. However, whether 527 could legally take
unlimited amounts of money from individuals was up for debate. The lack
of clarity about the status of 527s as appropriate vehicles for individual
contributions made many would-be political financiers nervous. After
Citizens United lifted restrictions on independent expenditures, an
individual or entity could donate unlimited amounts of money to a

coordinated communication under 11 CFR 109.21 or a party coordinated communication
under 11 CFR 109.37 (2 U.S.C. 431(17)).
105
SPEECHNOW.org v. Federal Election Comm'n., 599 F.3d 686 (D.C. Cir. 2010). See
discussion in Part B supra.
106
The Federal Election Commission recognizes Super PACs and hybrid PACs as political
action committees engaged in uncoordinated spending. A Super PAC (Independent
Expenditure-Only Political Committee) or Hybrid PAC (committee that maintains a noncontribution account) must register by filing FEC Form 1 [PDF] (Instructions [PDF]),
Statement of Organization within 10 days after raising or spending in excess of $1,000 in
connection with federal elections. Under "Type of Committee," the PAC would check box
5(f). Additionally, the committee must submit a letter to identify itself as a Super PAC or
Hybrid PAC.” (From the Federal Election Commission website, see
http://www.fec.gov/ans/answers_pac.shtml#super_hybrid).
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committee to communicate political messages without limit and without
being identified in the communication.107
A final way in which donations can be bundled and spent for political
advocacy is through so-called 401(c)(4)s named for the tax code under
which they fall. These Qualified Nonprofit Corporations (QNCs), may not
donate to political campaigns or parties directly, but they also have no
disclosure obligation with respect to donors.108 An important distinction
between Super PACs and QNCs is that the latter may not accept donations
from corporate or labor union treasuries.109 While QNCs are not directly
impacted by Citizens United and the fall-out, they do provide a mechanism
for wealth private individuals to funnel profits made through corporate
enterprise into politically motivated action groups without ever being
identified. According to one report issued in August of 2012, two such
nonprofits, Crossroads GPS and Americans for Prosperity, had spent almost
$60 million in television-based advertising geared toward the presidential
race. This figure surpassed the spending of even the wealthiest Super
PACs.110
Because of the variety of vehicles used to bundle funds—some of
them newly evolved since Citizens United was decided—the spending
107

The FEC requires Political Action Committees of all types to report on spending.
According to the FEC webpage, “After registering with the FEC, PACs must file regular
reports disclosing their receipts and disbursements. PACs have the option to file these
reports quarterly or monthly, and may change their filing frequency as often as once a year.
PACs that choose to file quarterly may be required to file certain pre- and post-election
reports,
depending
on
their
activity.”
(see
http://www.fec.gov/ans/answers_pac.shtml#super_hybrid).
108
According to the Federal Election Commission, “Qualified Nonprofit Corporations
(QNCs) may make electioneering communications. To qualify, the entity must be a
nonprofit corporation incorporated under 26 U.S.C. §501(c)(4) t hat is ideological in nature
and qualifies for exemptions under 11 CFR 114.10. . . .If a QNC makes electioneering
communications that aggregate in excess of $10,000 in a calendar year, it must certify that
it is eligible for the QNC exemption. The certification must include the name and address
of the corporation and the signature and printed name of the individual making the
qualifying statement. It must also certify that the corporation meets the standards of a
QNC, either by satisfying all of the qualifications at 11 CFR 114.10(c)(1)-(5), or through a
court ruling pursuant to 11 CFR 114.10(e)(1)(i)(B).”
109
“QNCs can neither make contributions to federal political committees, nor accept any
funds from corporations or labor organizations.” Id.
110
Kim Barker, Two Dark Money Groups Outspending All Super PACs Combined,
PROPUBLICA (Aug. 13, 2012, 11:50 AM), http://www.propublica.org/article/two-darkmoney-groups-outspending-all-super-pacs-combined; Alicia Budich & Robert Hendin,
Non-Profits Outspending Super PACs, CBSNEWS.COM (Aug. 19, 2012, 12:05 PM),
http://www.cbsnews.com/8301-3460_162-57496037/non-profits-outspending-super-pacs/.
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impact of Citizens United is difficult to directly measure. Moreover,
researchers draw different conclusions from the same data. For example,
measuring the post-Citizens United difference between spending in states
that had an existing ban on corporate independent political spending and
states without such bans is one way to discern the impact of Citizens United.
If the increase was substantially more in states that had had bans, it suggests
that the bans were successful in staunching the flow of political dollars, and
in removing them, the Court has substantially altered the course of political
campaigns. One study relying on this data asserted that “while spending did
increase more in the states with a prohibition, the fact that a significant
increase occurred across both set (sic) tells us that we should be looking for
alternative and more complicated explanations.”111 But another study that
looked at the same data “found an increase in independent expenditures that
was more than twice as large in the pool of states where bans had been in
place” and concluded that Citizens United was the “final straw in a long line
of cases that empower corporations to potentially overpower a system that is
predicated on the value that each individual voter has an equal voice.”112
A.

The Impact of Super PACs: Money in the 2012 Political Election

Even as the votes were being tallied, the total number of dollars spent
was being calculated by nonprofit reporting groups like The Sunlight
Foundation and the Center for Responsive Politics. The prevalence of the
Super PAC and 401(c)(4) money in elections was substantial. According to
the Center for Responsible Politics, in 2012, super PACs spent an estimated
$65 million on independent expenditures and were major players in more
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Keith E. Hamm, Michael J. Malbin, Jaclyn J. Kettler & Brendan Glavin, The Impact of
Citizens United in the States: Independent Spending in State Elections, 2006-2010, Paper
Presented at the 2012 meeting of the American Political Science Association, (2012), found
at http://www.cfinst.org/pdf/state/State-Indep-Spdg_2006-10_Working-Paper-as-Released22October2012.pdf.
112
Douglas Spencer & Abby Wood, Citizens United, States Divided: Evidence of Elasticity
in Independent Expenditures (June 6, 2012) (available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2046878
or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2046878); see also, Justin Levitt, Confronting the Impact
of Citizens United, 29 Yale L. & Pol. Rev. 217, 223 (2010) (“So why has Citizens United
provoked so much sound and fury? The populist environment, hostile to generic corporate
interests of many kinds, surely plays a part. So does the case’s aggressive procedural
approach, and its sweeping rhetoric, both of which seem to poke a finger in the eye of those
who disagree with the legal merits.”).
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than a dozen congressional races.113 A New York Times review of
corporate governance reports, tax returns of nonprofit organizations and
regulatory filings by insurers and labor unions revealed that corporate
donors included American Electric Power, Aetna, Prudential Financial, Dow
Chemical and the drug maker Merck. In October of 2012, two weeks before
the Presidential election, the spending figures were already record-breaking.
The Center for Responsible Politics revealed that Super PACs had spent
$428,677,605 for or against candidates.114 Corporations, individuals, and
other independent groups spent more than half that, for a figure totaling
$272,652,188.115 The conservative group connected with Karl Rove,
American Crossroads, organized as a SuperPAC had spent $63,129,654,
while its affiliate Crossroads GPS, organized as a 501(c)(4)116 totaled
$42,528,185 in spending, including $286,777 in electioneering
communication.117 Restore Our Future, Americans for Prosperity, and the
U.S. Chamber of Commerce, all conservative groups, had spent a total of
$164,699,683 in efforts to secure a win for conservative candidates. The
left-leaning Priorities USA Action group, organized as a Super PAC, had
spent $52,826,836. The price tag for election 2012 had lived up to the
expectations of the Center for Responsible Politics, which had reported the
“the 2012 election will not only be the most expensive election in U.S.
history, the cost will tower over the next most expensive election by more
than $700 million.”118
Two weeks later, by the close of polls, the totals were even more
astounding. Restore Our Future -- the super PAC that backed Republican
presidential nominee Mitt Romney – was responsible for $142,655,346 of
the total $631 million spent on independent expenditures by super PACs in
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2010 Outside Spending, by Super PACs, OpenSecrets.org,Center for Responsive
Politics
(last
updated
Nov.
12,
2012),
http://www.opensecrets.org/outsidespending/summ.php?cycle=2010&disp=O&type=S.
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Outside Spending, OpenSecrets.Org, CENTER FOR RESPONSIVE POLITICS (last visited
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the 2012 election cycle.119 Conservative super PAC American Crossroads
was second in spending, with a total of about $105 million. The affiliated
Crossroads GPS, the 501(c)(4) "social welfare" group, spent an additional
$70.8 million. Priorities USA Action, the group that supported President
Barack Obama, spent $66,182,180, rounding out the top three super
PACs.120 This spending was only a portion of the grand total. The Center
for Political Responsiveness notes, “Millions more have been spent on issue
ads running far enough before an election that they don't need to be reported
anywhere.”121
In mid-August, NBC Nightly News reported that half a billion dollars
had been spent just on television and radio advertisements.122 When this
total passed the 500 million mark, NBC anchor Brian Williams informed
viewers of what else that much money could buy: “Five hundred million
dollars could feed 9.2 million malnourished children for 50 days. It could
immunize 29 million children for life. It could provide clean water for 500
million children for 40 days . . . instead, it’s buying television commercials,
and the general election hasn’t even really started yet.”123 The satellite and
cable television business news channel CNBC reported in late October of
2012 that “Barack Obama and Mitt Romney are spending a combined
$26.86 every second this election cycle.”124
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All told, Campaign spending on messaging in the 2012 Presidential
election shattered previous records, topping six billion dollars, according to
the New York Times.125 Six billion dollars is more than the gross domestic
product (GDP)126 of many small countries. For example, in 2011, the most
recent year for which figures are available, Fiji’s GPD was 3,818,121,194,
Liberia’s was 1,545,461,660, Sierra Leone’s was 2,242,960,927, and
Barbados’ was 3,685,000,000. The number of Countries with GDP under 6
Billion was 40.127 The amount of money spent during the 2012 presidential
election cycle could have sustained a small nation for an entire year.128
III.

THE MAKING OF THE “APPEARANCE OF CORRUPTION”

In the Amicus Brief of the Democratic National Committee to the
Court in the Citizens United case, Robert Bauer, campaign finance counsel
to Obama, predicted that removing corporate campaign spending limits
would usher in “another spell of disillusionment.”129 Bauer forecasted “a
widespread sense that the rules were changed, and corporate political power
$53.7 million. All that totals more than $775 million dollars spent — before the crucial
election month of October.”).
125
Nicholas Confessore and Jess Bidgood, Little to Show for Cash Flood by Big Donors,
N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 7, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/11/08/us/politics/little-to-showfor-cash-flood-by-big-donors.html?ref=politics&_r=1& (“The most expensive election in
American history drew to a close this week with a price tag estimated at more than $6
billion, propelled by legal and regulatory decisions that allowed wealthy donors to pour
record amounts of cash into races around the country.”). In October, the Center for
Responsible Politics predicted the total, “Earlier this year, the Center for Responsive
Politics estimated that the 2012 election would cost $5.8 billion -- an estimate that already
made it the most expensive in history -- but with less than a week to go before the election,
CRP is revising the estimate upwards. According to CRP’s new analysis of Federal
Election Commission data, this election will likely cost $6 billion. Communications, 2012
Election Spending Will Reach $6 Billion, Center for Responsive Politics Predicts,
OpenSecrets.org, CENTER FOR RESPONSIVE POLITICS
(Oct.
31,
2012),
http://www.opensecrets.org/news/2012/10/2012-election-spending-will-reach-6.html
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value of the total final output of all goods and services produced in a single year within a
country's boundaries. See http://www.worldbank.org/depweb/beyond/global/chapter2.html
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World Bank info using 2011 numbers, so it does not include Liechtenstein, or several other
countries for which data is not current).
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Id.
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restored to commanding levels, just as the era of the small individual donor
had begun.”130 This sentiment captures the notion that the majority on the
Court was tipping the scales in favor of corporate interests and substantially
diminishing the ability of individual Americans to determine election
outcomes.131
A.

Concerns about Money in Political Elections

Early in 2012, this aggregation of wealth and spending came under
attack on several grounds. The objections were often explicitly triggered by
rising consternation about the new vehicles for spending, but at their most
fundamental, the arguments were as old as corruption itself. One prominent
concern was that groups would inappropriately influence lawmakers by
conspicuously spending money to get candidates elected who would, in turn,
vote for legislation benefitting those groups. A second, and related, concern
was that “average” (non-wealthy) citizens would have decreasing power to
influence the outcome of elections. Much of the discussion focused on the
potential for small donors’ contributions to be so overwhelmed by money
from wealthy donors that small donations ceased to matter. To the extent
that small donors and voters of little or average means perceived this to be
true, these constituencies would become disenchanted and disengage from
the political process.132 The uptick in influence of wealthy interests and the
130

Id.
For a discussion and empirical analysis of citizens’ views of money in politics see
Nathaniel Persily & Kelli Lammie, Perceptions of Corruption and Campaign Finance:
When Public Opinion Determines Constitutional Law, 153 U. Pa. L. Rev. 119, 174 (2004).
Persily and Lammie “find some support for several alternative hypotheses to the theory that
improper influences on government generate Americans' perceptions of corruption.” They
also conclude by saying, “In the end, we must admit that large shares of the American
population distrust their government and believe the campaign finance system is a source
of undue influence.” Id.
132
Of course, this concern is not new. More than twenty years ago, Dan Lowenstein wrote:
A common way of describing this type of situation is to say that
there is an “appearance of impropriety.” While not exactly wrong,
discussion of the campaign finance question in terms of
appearances is misleading. It suggests that there is an underlying
reality that is either proper or not proper, and if we could only
look behind the locked door or, perhaps, into the legislator's head,
we would know. Used as a rationale for reform measures, the
argument is that the appearance of impropriety is a sufficient
131
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dwindling impact of average citizens was echoed by a related fear, namely
that money, rather than quality, would select winners. After the 2012
election, the Center for Responsible Politics reported that “candidates who
had the most money on their side (from their campaign and from outside
sources) won 92.7 percent of House and 63.6 percent of Senate races.”133
Although money could be an indication of support generally, it could also
represent the backing by disproportionately wealth interests, such as the
wealthiest companies, such as oil, technology interests, or pharmaceuticals.
The objections came not only from outside observers. Lawmakers
themselves were vocal about the negative consequences of unlimited interest
group spending. When Charles Roemer, former Louisiana governor and
congressman, testified before the Senate Judiciary Committee in a hearing
entitled, “Taking Back Our Democracy: Responding to Citizens United and
the Rise of Super PACs,” he asserted that
Washington DC is not just broken. It is bought, rented, leased, owned
by the money givers. Special interests, the bundlers, PACs, Super PACs,
lobbyists, the Wall Street bankers, the pharmaceuticals, the corporate giants,
the insurance companies, organized labor, the GSE’s like Fannie and
Freddie, energy companies, on and on and on and on. And this is not about
one party versus the other, or about one person or another. It is about
systemic and institutional corruption where the size of your check rather
than the strength of your need or idea determine your place in line.134
During the same hearing, Professor Lawrence Lessig pointed out that in the
2012 election cycle, .000063%, or 196 citizens, had funded 80% of the
justification for reform, because it undermines popular confidence
in government. Depending on who is speaking and who is
listening, there may be an implied wink to the effect that
impropriety is really very unlikely but that some sop must be
thrown to the ignorantly suspicious public. Alternatively, the
implied wink may suggest that of course there is impropriety, but
it would be impolitic to say so directly.
Daniel Hays Lowenstein, On Campaign Finance Reform: The Root of All Evil Is Deeply
Rooted, 18 Hofstra L. Rev. 301, 326 (1989).
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7, 2012, 7:38 PM), http://www.opensecrets.org/news/2012/11/post-election.html.
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Roemer, former Governor of Louisiana).
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super-PAC spending. Lessig went on to tell lawmakers that “the elected are
dependent upon the tiniest slice of America, yet that tiny slice is in no way
representative of the rest of America. This . . . is corruption.”135
B. Availability of Information and the Creation of Appearance
The American public would seem to agree with Lessig. As one
commentator has noted, “If limits on contributions are permissible only in
times and places where wide segments of the public believe that special
interests exert too much influence over politics, then they are permissible in
all times and places. The public always believes this, and it always will.”136
Much of the public’s information about money in elections comes from
various television, print, and web-based media. Because money in politics
is controversial, and controversy sells, news outlets regularly report on
political election spending. Television and print media tout segments like
“Keeping them Honest,”137 “Fact Check,”138 and “Political Hotsheet,”139
which are designed to uncover information that the public might otherwise
not have. Websites like FactCheck.org140 and OpenSecrets.org141 are
dedicated to divulging the facts behind controversial topics, American
citizens are provided with fact-based information they likely would not have
otherwise had. As a result, dollars spent do influence how the public views
the political campaign process. For example, in response to the defeating of
the DISCLOSE Act142, in July of 2012, CNN reported “Nearly 700
135
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independent political groups have poured more than $187 million into 2012
campaigns nationwide so far, according to FEC records compiled by the
Center for Responsive Politics.”143 ProPublica144 keeps a running tally of
PAC and Super PAC contributions, including how much money is garnered
and in support or opposition of which political candidate.145 The Center for
Responsive Politics allows visitors to look up donations by individual or
company name, and keeps a current list of interest group contributions.146
In addition to media reports of campaign spending, Americans
witnessed a dramatic uptick in the number of political advertisements. The
vast majority of this spending went to political messaging, much of it in the
form of television advertisements. In 2008, the last time Americans were
deciding on a president, approximately 730,000 advertisements aired in the
four months prior to the election.147 During the same time period in the 2012
election, the number was 1,015,615—representing a 39 percent increase.
This jump was surprising, even to the co-director of the research group that
provided the analysis, Erika Fowler. Fowler commented, “Everyone
expected ads to be more abundant this election than in 2008, especially with
super PAC involvement and both candidates opting out of public funding,
but passing the one million mark is a real milestone.”148

(6/24/2010--Passed House amended. Democracy is Strengthened by Casting Light on
Spending in Elections Act or DISCLOSE Act - Title I: Regulation of Certain Political
Spending )( In July 2012, Senate Republicans blocked the DISCLOSE Act, as the 53-45
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C. Empirical Polling Data on Citizen Perceptions
As campaign spending becomes more conspicuous to the American
public, the potential for the perception of corruption increases. In spite of
the fact that most Americans are not well informed about Supreme Court
opinions,149 the public has evinced a groundswell of opposition to such
spending, suggesting that citizens are taking notice.150
1.

Polling before Citizens United

Polls conducted before the Citizens United opinion reveals that
Americans have been concerned about corruption in government for some
time. For example, during the 2008 primary election, Gallup conducted a
poll asking about the "importance of candidates' positions on each issue in
influencing Americans' vote for President."
Corruption was rated
151
extremely/very important by 79% of those polled.
Interestingly, concerns
over corruption in government outranked concerns about terrorism, social
security, Medicare and taxes. Gallup conducted another poll in February of
2010 poll asking "What are the one or two weaknesses of the United States
that make you most pessimistic about the future of the country over the next
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20 years." Those polled rated "Poor Governance (politics, Congress,
corruption, etc...)" to be the biggest weakness of the United States. 152
These concerns appeared to have been connected to attitudes about
campaign finance as well. An empirical article that examined polling data
from immediately prior to Citizens United found “strong support” among
almost half (49%) of respondents for the assertion that “Candidates who run
for federal offices should only be allowed to spend money funded through a
public financing system. No individual or political action committee
contributions would be allowed.”153 Almost seventy percent (69%) were
strongly in support of the statement, “Free and equal airtime on television
should be available for candidates.”154 Political corruption was tied for
second as the most important issue facing America along with a balanced
budget and education (and after unemployment). However, respondents in
this study also ranked campaign spending as low on the list of priorities,
second-to-last. The fact that respondent were simultaneously worried about
corruption in government and unconcerned about campaign spending would
suggest that there was little perceived connection between the two.
2.

Polling after Citizens United

Since Citizens United was decided, there seems to have been a shift in
views of the public. A poll conducted in April of 2012, revealed that
Americans are inferring a connection between campaign spending and
corruption.155 This poll suggested that Americans fear that elected officials
are influenced by Super PACs and corporate interests, and further, that this
152
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beliefs may influence voting behavior.156 According to the survey,
conducted by the Brennan Center for Justice at NYU School of Law,
Americans believe that money spent – even if it is not directly given to a
candidate’s campaign fund or political party organization—impacts how a
candidate votes. More than two-thirds of all respondents (68%) agreed that
a company that spent $100,000 to help elect a member of Congress could
successfully pressure him or her to change a vote on proposed legislation.157
Republicans and Democrats were equally supportive of this notion (both at
71%), and only one in five respondents disagreed.158 More than threequarters of all respondents (77%) thought that a member of Congress would
put the interests of a group that spent millions to advertise for him or her
before the interests of the public.159 Republicans and Democrats agreed
with this view in similar numbers (81% and 79% respectively).
Other recent polls tell a similar story. A CBS/New York Times poll
from January of 2012 asked "Which one of the following two positions on
campaign financing do you favor more: limiting the amount of money
individuals can contribute to political campaigns, or allowing individuals to
contribute as much money to political campaigns as they'd like?" Almost
two-thirds of respondents favored limiting money spent for political
advertising.160 Similarly, more than two-thirds favored limiting the amount
of money that groups can spend independently to get political candidates
elected.161 A Washington Post-ABC News Poll conducted by telephone
from March 7 to 10, 2012, found that nearly seven in 10 registered voters
would like super PACs to be illegal, including more than half who feel that
way strongly. Sixty-nine percent of Americans expressed the view that super
PACs should be banned. Only 25 percent said they should remain legal.162
156

National Survey: Super PACs, Corruption, and Democracy, BRENNAN CENTER FOR
JUSTICE
(April
24,
2012),
http://www.brennancenter.org/content/resource/national_survey_super_pacs_corruption_an
d_democracy
157
Id.
158
Id.
159
Id.
160
Politics,
POLLINGREPORT.COM
(last
visited
Feb.
13,
2013),
http://www.pollingreport.com/politics.htm
161
Id.
162
Chris Cillizza & Aaron Blake, Poll: Voters Want Super PACs to be Illegal, The Fix
Blog,
THE
WASHINGTON
POST
(March
13,
2012,
7:00
AM),
http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/the-fix/post/poll-voters-want-super-pacs-to-beillegal/2012/03/12/gIQA6skT8R_blog.html

36

A third survey, conducted in June of 2012 by Clarus Research Group for
Common Good, a nonpartisan government reform coalition, found that 57
percent of American voters think the current system of financing political
campaigns doesn't work.163 The poll numbers, published in the Atlantic,
also reveal that 80 percent of those polled indicated that they believe that
members of Congress are more interested in being re-elected than they are
in improving the campaign finance system. Almost nine out of ten think
that all political campaign contributions and expenditures should be publicly
disclosed, and three quarters of those responding would support an
amendment to the U.S. Constitution that would give Congress the power to
limit the amount of money that can be spent on political campaigns for
president and Congress.164
The most recent poll, commissioned by the Corporate Reform
Coalition, also explored Americans’ attitudes toward corporate political
spending. 165 The results, reported in the October 2012 issue of Demos,
found that almost nine of ten (98%) Americans polled agreed with the
statement, “There is way too much corporate money in politics,” and 51
percent strongly agreed.166 Seventy percent of those polled expressed the
view that a ban on corporate funded political ads would improve politics in
America, and more than half advocated a Constitutional amendment to ban
all corporate political spending. 167 Greater than eight out of ten (84%)
people surveyed agreed that corporate political spending “drowns out the
voices of average Americans,” and similar numbers (83%) believe that
corporations and corporate CEOs have too much political power. 168
Similarly, more than eighty percent of Americans agree that corporate
political spending has made federal politics more negative (83%) and
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Congress more corrupt (84%).169
Reported concerns about state-level
elections were similar, with eight of ten Americans agreeing that corporate
political spending makes state politics more negative and 78% believing that
this influence is corrupting in this forum. 170 Finally, the Corporate Reform
Coalition poll shows that Americans are prepared to take action consistent
with their professed concerns. Seventy-nine percent of those polled would
refuse to buy a company’s product or services to protest a company’s
political spending. 171 Two out of three people (65%) would sell stock in the
company, and more than half (53%) would take other steps to avoid
investing in the company. 172 Fifty-two percent of those polled would go to a
meeting of the company’s shareholders to ask for disclosure, and seventyfive percent would sign a petition to the SEC for corporate disclosure.173
These findings are powerful evidence that the current campaign
finance laws are failing to address the appearance of corruption.
Particularly concerning is data revealing a growing cynicism on the part of
Americans, and evidence that these attitudes influence behavior. Citizen
distrust in the democratic process threatens the health of a democracy.
IV. WHY APPEARANCE MATTERS: THE CONSEQUENCES OF PERCEPTIONS OF
CORRUPTION
Although most of the Court’s discussion of corruption has centered on
actual corruption, the Court has is acknowledged that the appearance of
corruption is an evil unto itself. As previously noted, “appearance” has
received very little independent attention. Nevertheless, the Court has
evinced a willingness to consider the perceptions of the public in a variety of
169
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campaign finance opinions. There are two ways in which the Court has
manifested a belief that appearances matter. The first is directly, by
explicitly referencing the concern in dicta. The second is indirectly, through
the type of evidence it considered relevant in making determinations.
A. The Court’s View of Appearance of Corruption
The Court has characterized avoiding the appearance of corruption as a
“compelling” interest in all of the major campaign finance cases, including
Buckley, McConnell, Austin, and Citizens United.174 Even in the most recent
Speechnow.org district court case, the court noted that “the [Supreme] Court
expanded the definition [of corruption] to include ‘the appearance of undue
influence’ created by large donations given for the purpose of ‘buying
access.’” 175 The Speechnow opinion cited the Court’s earlier reticence
about adopting a pure quid-pro-quo definition of corruption, based on the
concern that this was a “crabbed view of corruption, and particularly of the
appearance of corruption” that “ignores precedent, common sense, and the
realities of political fundraising.” 176 In spite of the Court’s adoption of the
narrow quid-pro-quo definition of “corruption,” the Court has never
retracted its view of the dangers posed by the appearance of corruption.
The Buckley v. Valeo, opinion maintained that when it citizens believe that
the government is corrupt then they lose faith in the government's ability not
only to function, but more importantly to be responsive to the needs of the
people. 177 Avoiding this outcome was a vital governmental interest in 1976,
and it remains one today.
Of course, the important governmental interest on one side of the
equation must be balanced against the freedom of speech interest on the
other. The question is not whether political speech is valuable. As one
commentator noted,
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The issue is not the value of speech that is acknowledged by all.
The issue is whether independent expenditures by corporations
give rise to an appearance of corruption, for avoiding that
appearance is acknowledged to be a governmental interest
compelling enough to justify restricting the speech that causes the
appearance.178

In evaluating this balance, members of the judiciary, including those
on the Supreme Court have accepted empirical evidence of citizen
perception in past cases. For example, in Daggett v. Comm’n on
Governmental Ethics,179 the court noted that 70% of survey respondents
“believed that large campaign contributions were a major source of political
corruption” and that new limits on contributions would bolster faith in the
democratic process. In Montana Right to Life Ass’n180, the court accepted
polls showing that 78% of Montana voters thought money was
“synonymous with power” and that 69% of Montanans believed “elected
officials gave special treatment” to large contributors. In Homans v. City of
Albuquerque,181 the district court, while striking down spending limits as
unconstitutional under Buckley, accepted a public opinion poll of city voters
who believed that federal elections, which had no spending limits, were
more susceptible to special interest influence than local elections, which
were governed by spending limits.182
The courts pay attention to data about citizen perceptions because,
they are aware that a lack of faith in political institutions have negative
consequences for democracy generally. One team of researchers noted that
"[a]ttitudes toward the processes of government, as apart from the policies,
178
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constitute an important, free-standing variable that has serious implications
for the health of democracy"183 Harvard law professor Phillip Heyman has
written:
[C]orruption undermines the culture of democracy. When people
lose confidence that public decisions are taken for reasons that are
publicly available and justifiable, they become cynical about
public speech and deliberation. People come to expect duplicity in
public speech, and the expectation tarnishes all public officials,
whether or not they are corrupt. And when people are mistrustful
of government, they are also cynical about their own capacities to
act on public goods and purposes and will prefer to attend to
narrow domains of self-interest they can control. Corruption in this
way diminishes the horizons of collective actions and in so doing
shrinks the domain of democracy. Finally, corruption undermines
democratic capacities of association within civil society by
generalizing suspicion and eroding trust and reciprocity. 184

Ultimately, the cost to democracy is the refusal of citizens to participate. As
Stevens pointed out, “[t]ake away Congress’ authority to regulate the
appearance of undue influence and ‘the cynical assumption that large donors
call the tune could jeopardize the willingness of voters to take part in
democratic governance.’”185
Political scientist Mark Warren argues that democracies, because they
involve political conflict and because political actors do not encapsulate all
of the best interests of all of the constituents necessarily involve distrust.186
Because of this inevitable byproduct of adversarial political system, in order
for democracies to function, citizens must trust the process. Otherwise, the
people will feel disenfranchised and will stop participating. Warren notes
that
[in Buckley], the Court argued that there was no connection
between spending and corruption, because the possibilities for
improper influence were regulated at the source. What the Court
failed to see is that, in aggregate, candidates engaged in spending
183
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races need to rely on a relatively wealthy class of people and
interest groups who, in aggregate, have interests that differ from
the less wealthy. Under these circumstances, the public is
justified in inferring improper influences from high levels of
privately financed spending in itself.187

The belief that wealthy interests—rather than the citizens who populate the
country—dictate which candidates win elections erodes confidence in the
democratic process. Lack of trust in the election outcomes undermines the
sense that Americans have that they play a meaningful role in selecting the
men and women who create the laws that govern society. Ultimately, the
people lose faith in their own ability to be politically efficacious.
B.

Political Efficacy Research

The link between the perception of corruption and the breakdown of
participatory democracy is best viewed through the lens of “political
efficacy.” “Political efficacy” defined as understanding political issues and
engagement in activities supporting a political candidate, and responsiveness
on the part of the government to participation by the citizenry in politics. 188
Contemporary work in political efficacy has been informed by two lines of
work from social psychology on self-efficacy more generally. The first line
of work conceives of self-efficacy as primarily motivational, or
characterized by an effort to influence events and outcomes. 189 The second
relates to a cognitive view of efficacy, which focuses on the degree to which
an individual anticipates and perceives control over her environment.190
Albert Bandura has written, “Unless people believe they can product desired
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effects by their actions, they have little incentive to act. Efficacy belief is,
therefore, the foundation of action.”191
Political efficacy is the manifestation of a particular form of personal
and collective influence. This form of efficacy is generally realized early in
life, long before meaningful political input is possible. Researchers have
found that as early as third grade, children have already formed a basic
sense of political efficacy.192 Although children grasp political efficacy
early on, it can change over the course of a lifetime. When an individual
invests time or money in political campaigns, these actions lead to increases
in internal political efficacy. 193 Internal efficacy can be understood as
reflecting the individual’s assessment of how much power or influence he or
she can have on the course of political events and outcomes. External
efficacy—characterized by government responsiveness—represents a
general evaluation of the receptiveness of political institutions to input from
all individuals in society collectively. One study found that high investment
activities are more likely to lead to an increase in efficacy than lowinvestment activities, but that both high and low-investment activities
contributed to voter feelings that they could have an effect on
government.194 In a cross-country study looking at the connection between
corruption and democracy, the authors found that in democracies with
higher levels of corruption citizens reported a lower level of satisfaction
with the performance of their political systems and lower levels of trust in
public servants.195
Political efficacy is important because the more internal efficacy a
citizen experiences, the more likely he or she is to vote and to engage in
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other forms of political participation.196 Empirical findings support this
conclusion. An early study of the impact of income level on political
efficacy reported that an individual’s feeling of political efficacy was related
to other measures of power in society. The authors found “[l]arge
differences in . . .political participation . . . among persons in different
income and race strata.”197 The study asked respondents to report on the
number of elections in which they had voted since they were eligible to
vote. The authors reported that “the distribution of their responses followed
exactly the income-race hierarchy: almost nine-tenths of the rich198 indicated
they had always voted, followed by the middle-income whites, middleincome blacks, poor whites, and poor blacks in that order. Moreover, the
relationship between political efficacy and participation is self-perpetuating.
Feelings of efficacy increase likelihood of voting or volunteering time of
money,199 and one’s level of participation in turn, influences the degree to
which a citizen feels efficacious.200 Research has demonstrated the
correlation between involvement in campaigns and the perception of
efficacy. 201 Individuals who believe that they can effect change through
participation in politics tend to be actively involved in politics, while those
who perceive that political institutions and processes are unresponsive to
them, become politically apathetic.202 As discussed above, Buckley v. Valeo
mandated regulating the "appearance of corruption" because corruption
creates a lack of trust in government, thus discouraging people from
participating.203
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Voting is the most basic and most prevalent way Americans participate
in political life. History teaches us that Americans' perception of corruption
affects their voting behaviors. After a political scandal, for example,
citizens are less likely to vote. In the 1976 election, with memories of
Watergate still fresh, four million fewer people voted than had in the 1972
election. 204 The growing perception that increased independent spending by
PACs and corporations leads to corruption seems also to influence plans to
participate in elections. A report by the Brennan Center for Justice205 states,
“An alarming number of Americans report that their concerns about the
influence of donors to outside political groups make them less likely to
engage in democracy.” 206 According to the poll results, two in three
Americans (65%) express a lack of faith in government because “big donors
to Super PACs have more influence than regular voters.” 207 The crisis of
confidence was exhibited by Republicans (67%) and Democrats (69%)
alike. Most concerning, a quarter of Americans (26%) say that they are less
likely to cast a ballot because of the unequal influence big donors have over
elected officials through contributions to Super PACs. 208 Another study
completed by Common Cause Minnesota looked at the impact of campaign
contributions on people's perception of corruption and desire to participate
in politics. The study confirmed that there was a substantial number of
people, 33% polled, who would be less likely to participate because they
believed that contributions allowed those who donated to influence the
political process.209 When citizens feel that they cannot influence politics
they do not participate.210
Government: A Tim Series Analysis, 64 PUB. OPINION Q. (200)) (discussing what causes
declining trust in Government and consequences of that declining trust).
204
John Wolley and Gerhard Peters, Voter Turnout in Presidential Elections: 1828-2008,
THE AMERICAN PRESIDENCY PROJECT, http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/data/turnout.php
205
The Brennan Center for Justice is a New York University.
206
National Survey: Super PACs, Corruption, and Democracy, BRENNAN CENTER FOR
JUSTICE (April 24, 2012), http://www.brennancenter.org/analysis/national-survey-superpacs-corruption-and-democracy
207
Id.
208
Id.
209
Todd Paulson and David Schultz, Bucking Buckley: Voter Attitudes, Tobacco Money,
and Campaign Contribution Corruption in Minnesota Politics, 19 HAMLINE J. PUB. L.
& POL'Y. 449, 469 (1997-1998)
210
See generally Pollock, Philip H. III. 1983. The Participatory Consequences of Internal
and External Political Efficacy: A Research Note, 36 W. POL. Q., 400- 409. See also Philip
B. Heymann, Democracy and Corruption, 20 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 329, 328-329 (1996-

45

Perceptions of corruption also influence attitudes about lawmakers and
political parties. Americans who generally believe that government is
corrupt tend to attribute that corruption to the party in control, regardless of
whether a Democrat or Republican occupies the White House.211 Hence,
perceptions can systematically undercut faith in the executive. Moreover,
individual candidates who run for election during a period when Americans
perceive corruption in government are more vulnerable on election day. 212
This is true even for candidates who are innocent of suspicious activity. In
other words, an air of corruption that hangs around government casts a pall
over all law-makers, and influences global judgments about government.
Perhaps for this reason, the problem of fundraising and campaign spending
has become a familiar theme on Capital Hill, and in the American political
discourse. As Lessig testified, politicians who are “forced into a cycle of
perpetual fund-raising, . . .become—or at least most Americans believe
[they] become—responsive to the will of the funders. . . “213
V.

ELECTION 2012 AND THE OBAMA CAMPAIGN

With escalating costs of political elections and growing dissatisfaction
in government, the 2012 election cycle could have marked the beginning of
a significant downturn in citizen engagement.
However, some
characteristics of the election, and specifically of Barack Obama’s
campaign, may have muted some of the influence of burgeoning campaign
spending. Specifically, Obama’s campaign strategies to personally engage
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voters arguably demonstrate the importance of political efficacy and suggest
caution for future elections.
A.

Evidence of an Efficacy-Action Connection

The 2008 presidential election of Barack Obama is a case study of the
relationship between feelings of political efficacy in voters and political
engagement, as measured by various forms of participation. Obama’s
campaign tactics revolutionized the way candidates reach voters. His
campaign reached voters directly through social media, his messages were
personalized, emotional, and designed to instill in the recipient a sense of
power. One study of 2008 voters reported that “both internal and external
efficacy are positively related to a vote for Barack Obama in the 2008
election, suggesting that he was able to appeal to those who were more
optimistic about their political influence.”214 Research shows a connection
between emotional appeals and political involvement. 215 The authors of one
study found that “candidates who appeal to voters through the use of
emotions are rewarded with increased support across a range of different
types of participation.”216 Hence is it not surprising that direct emotional
appeals increased participation; voter turnout in the 2008 election reached a
level (62%) not seen since 1968.217 Interestingly, Obama’s election also
drew the greatest number of individual contributions by average (middleincome) voters in modern times.218 A full third of Obama’s campaign
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contributions came from small donors.219 Because Obama was the first (and
only, in the 2008 election) candidate not to accept public funding for the
general campaign, the only comparisons existing are for the primary
election. He outpaced all presidential candidates in the primary season with
respect to small donor donations, receiving 30% of donations from donors
giving less than $200.220 In the general election, the percentage of donations
from small donors rose to 34%.221 While a correlation between a
historically high number of small donors and reports of feelings of high
political efficacy is not conclusive, it does suggest that when average
individuals perceive that their contributions are making a difference in a
political campaign, they have a greater sense of ownership and involvement
in the election. Moreover, political efficacy research lends support to the
notion that Obama voters reported greater internal political efficacy than
both McCain voters and nonvoters.222
B.

What Happened in 2012

After the run-up to the 2012 presidential and congressional elections,
two things seem clear. First, the amount of money spent in political
elections is growing, and growing quickly. Second, to the extent that
American citizens are paying attention, they are unhappy about the trend,
and perceive a variety of negative consequences. Social science research
and theory suggests that the rapid growth of campaign spending and public
219
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anxiety about this spending may usher in a new era of disillusionment and
disengagement from the political process. The question then becomes
whether the 2012 election cycle reveals evidence of a troubled democracy.
All in all, the results for 2012 were mixed. On the one hand, individuals
who were committed to a particular candidate or political party donated and
volunteered in greater numbers. On the other hand, voter turn-out was
lower than it had been in the past two presidential elections. A closer look
suggests that even the depressed 2012 voting numbers may not be
sustainable in future elections. In particular, the extraordinary success of the
Obama campaign’s get-out-the vote efforts may well have prevented what
could have been a far more substantial downturn in citizen participation.
1.

Small donations and volunteering was up.

With respect to financial participation, donations were up among small
donors. One way to measure the activity of small donors is to look at webbased and other targeted Democratic fundraising efforts, because this is
where activity was pivotal in the 2008 election cycle. In the months leading
up to the 2012 election, the Democrats' congressional fundraising arms had
record success with small donors, surpassing their 2008 numbers. By the
fall of 2011, contributions to the Democratic Congressional Campaign
Committee (DCCC) of $200 or less had totaled $21.5 million.223 Its
Republican counterpart, the National Republican Congressional Committee,
saw an increase from $10.7 million through the first 11 months of 2009 to
$12.6 million during the same period in 2011.224 This figure represents an
eighteen percent increase in funds from small contributors. 225 However,
ultimately, as was true in 2008, the Democrats had the most success in the
realm of small-donor fundraising.226
As one observer put it “In raising
money from those giving less than $200, Obama is a major league slugger
while Romney is still waiting to be called up from the minor leagues. And
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that has made an enormous difference to the campaigns' bottom lines.”227
Volunteer numbers were also strong in 2012. Days before the election,
Obama’s campaign manager, Jim Messina, announced the existence of
5,100 “Get Out The Vote” (GOTV) stations in battleground states. The
Obama campaign also had commitments from 700,000 volunteers to help
with the GOTV effort. In July of 2012, a Huffington Post article noted,
“Call them passionate, idealistic, earnest, even a tad naive: The volunteers
helping to power the Obama and Romney campaigns are outliers at a time
when polls show record low public satisfaction with government and a
growing belief that Washington isn't on their side.”228
The Obama campaign was, in many experts’ estimation, an aberration.
For example, Obama's 2008 campaign set an unprecedented standard for
grass-roots involvement when it created the on-line platform,
MyBarackObama.com which attracted record numbers of volunteers with
the phrase: "This election is not about me, it's about you."229 The President
was able to up the ante in 2012. In a substantially closer race, turn-out was
a vital part of the strategy.230 On election day, in November 2012, the
Democrats' turnout efforts were impressive, and some would say historic.231
The month before the election, the Obama campaign released a memo in
which it reported 1,792,261 voters in key battleground states, "nearly double
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the number of voters the Obama campaign registered in 2008."232 CNN
reported that “[t]he 125 million voter contacts the Obama team claimed
were more than twice the Republican total, [and t]he hundreds of
Democratic field offices outnumbered GOP outposts by greater than 2-1 or
3-1 in key swing states.”233 In early November, a memorandum from the
Obama camp claimed that the campaign had made 125,646,479 personal
phone calls or visits.234 The Huffington Post reported that “[i]f that number
is accurate, then the campaign has contacted roughly one out of every 2.5
people in the entire country since the last election.”235 This number dwarfed
the 50 million voter contacts the Romney campaign has claimed,
particularly given that the Romney total included mailers left at doors.236
Susan Page of USA Today observed that the “Obama's campaign is
spending millions of dollars on the most elaborate field operation in U.S.
political history, aimed at delivering both core supporters and reluctant ones
to the polls.”237
Obama’s well-publicized strategy may have led Republican candidate
Mitt Romney to redouble efforts as well. In early November, the Romney
campaign appears to have stepped up efforts in order to avoid the fate of
McCain in 2008, when early polling left the Republican presidential
candidate behind, even in states where his numbers looked promising.238 In
early November 2012, CBS reported that the RNC was hyping “an
aggressive early voting program that . . .[similar to] that of the famously
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well-organized Obama campaign.”239 Kirsten Kukowski, a spokesperson for
the RNC estimated two million contacts on election day. 240 In response to
Obama’s opening 106 field offices in Florida—a battleground state—the
Romney campaign said it, too, had increased inroads in Florida, outpacing
the 2008 efforts of then-candidate John McCain.241
2.

Voter turn-out was down

In spite of the candidates’ efforts, a report estimating the percentage of
eligible voters who cast ballots in the 2012 election showed that voter
turnout was lower than in the past two presidential contests. 242 The report,
from the Center for the Study of the American Electorate, put 2012 voter
turnout at 57.5% of all eligible voters, compared to 62.3% who voted in
2008 and 60.4% who cast ballots in 2004.243 An estimated 126 million
people voted in the election, meaning that 93 million eligible citizens did not
cast ballots.244 Curtis Gans, director of American University's Center for the
Study of the American Electorate, noted that in a majority of states, the
numbers of people showing up at the polls was even lower than eight years
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prior. 245 The 2012 turnout percentage of eligible voters who cast a ballot
was down from 2008 in every state and the District of Columbia, except two
– Iowa and Louisiana. 246 "Beyond the people with passion, we have a
disengaged electorate," Gans said.247 Reponses from non-voters tend to
support this conclusion. In a poll conducted by Suffolk University and USA
Today, 54% stated their reason for not voting of non-voters call politics
"corrupt." "The long-term trend tends to be awful," Gans says. "There's a
lot of lack of trust in our leaders, a lack of positive feelings about political
institutions . . .” 248
The uncommon success of the Obama campaign in getting voters to
the polls likely disguised what would have been an even more significant
downturn in voting among American citizens. 249 Future elections, will tell.
Although the Obama campaign has moved the art of campaigning into the
21st century, it remains to be seen whether the success of the Obama
campaign can be duplicated. Part of President Obama's strength as a
campaigner was his ability to connect to voters by evoking in them a sense
of personal efficacy; this factor helped to propel him to victory in 2008 and
2012. A combination of the unique ability of the Obama campaign to
engage voters and the historic significance of the Obama presidency250 make
it likely that there will be even more depressed voter turnout than what
occurred from 2008 to 2012 because these campaigns will likely not be
245
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duplicable. While 131 million251 people voted in the 2008 presidential
election, about 126 million citizens voted in the 2012 election.252 This
difference of 5 million voters from 2008 to 2012 may have been
substantially larger if several of the unique features of the 2012 election had
been absent.
CONCLUSION
The 2012 Supreme Court case, Citizens United, which lifted the ban
on unlimited independent corporate campaign spending, left an indelible
footprint on American politics. The case was notable less for its immediate
impact than for its symbolic significance and for the door it left open for
new super-committees capable of amassing large sums to spend on political
communication. A great deal of debate has focused on the legitimacy of the
opinion and the desirability of its effects.253 However, relatively little
attention has been given to its potential to shape Americans’ attitudes about
the political election process. Whether the trigger was the publicity Citizens
United received, or the controversy around Super PACs, or whether it is
simply a growing distaste for the proliferation of campaign ads, Americans
are expressing record levels of dissatisfaction with the state of campaign
financing.254
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One measure that has been proposed by opponents of Citizen United is
liberal disclosure rules. The DISCLOSE Act255 passed in the House of
Representatives, and filibustered in Congress, may return in some form—
particularly if the American public exhibits sustained and robust
dissatisfaction with the post-Citizens United situation. Of course, the notion
that disclosure is a complete panacea seems naïve to many,256 in spite of
Kennedy assertion in Citizens United that “transparency enables the
electorate to make informed decisions and give proper weight to different
speakers and messages.”257 Even assuming that disclosure of sources of
funding is the perfect solution to combat actual corruption, the appearance
problem looms. Although some citizens may feel reassured by having
access to donor lists, having this information may have counterproductive
effects. Measures to combat actual corruption, such as liberal disclosure of
money spent, may make the appearance of corruption problem worse. The
more the American people know about the extent to which financial might
behind political campaigns is consolidated with various extremely wealthy
individuals and groups with easily identifiable agendas, the more likely they
may be to deem the entire system corrupt. As this article has illustrated, a
wide-spread loss of confidence in the political system has the potential for
serious, negative repercussions. With perfect disclosure and maximum
benefit from disclosure, namely complete accountability, we might
eliminate actual corruption258 but might still have robust perception of
corruption. 259 Election law expert, Rick Hasen points out that

255

H.R.5175 - DISCLOSE Act (6/24/2010--Passed House amended. Democracy is
Strengthened by Casting Light on Spending in Elections Act or DISCLOSE Act - Title I:
Regulation of Certain Political Spending )
256
See e.g., Dan Ortiz’s tongue-in-cheek remark, “No need to worry about limiting money,
the Court seems to think: disclosure will take care of everything.” Daniel R. Ortiz, The
Informational Interest, 27 J.L. & Pol. 663, 664 (2012).
257
Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 916 (internal citations omitted).
258
The definition of which is up for debate.
259
As Robert Bauer has written, “If the appearance of corruption undermines, to a
‘disastrous extent,’ citizen confidence in government, then it does so regardless of whether
it can be linked persuasively to actual corruption.” (Robert F. Bauer, The Varieties of
Corruption and the Problem of Appearance: A Response to Professor Samaha, 125 Harv.
L. Rev. F. 91, 93 (2012) responding to Adam M. Samaha, Regulation for the Sake of
Appearance, 125 Harv. L. Rev. 1563 (2012)).

55

[F]oreign spending on U.S. elections could undermine the
integrity of the electoral process. If such spending is significant
and it is disclosed, voters could believe that foreign nationals are
improperly influencing either the outcome of U.S. elections
(through pursuit of an electoral strategy) or the legislative
decisions made by elected officials (through pursuit of a
260
legislative strategy).

There is no easy escape from this conundrum, absent restoring campaign
finance laws to their pre-Citizens United state.
In Citizens United, the Court put an exclamation point on its previous
rejection of a “level playing field” rationale for campaign funding
regulations.261 Whether or not Americans have read the case, or even heard
the reasoning, they have noticed the effects. Most Americans have
concluded that the political election process is corrupt,262 they believe that
they are losing their voice, and wealthy interests are hijacking the political
election process. 263 As one commentator put it, “[i]t is no wonder . . . that
an egalitarian vision of democratic politics is lacking in the United States.
The U.S. Supreme Court has made it impossible to articulate such a
vision.”264 In Shrink Missouri, Justice Breyer articulated a vision of reforms
that would “seek to build public confidence in the [election] process and
broaden the base of a candidate's meaningful financial support, encouraging
the public participation and open discussion that the First Amendment itself
presupposes.265 If Super PAC spending continues to dominate the political
campaign scene, Breyer’s vision will not be realized, and increasing
numbers of Americans may stay home on election day.
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